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ABSTRACT
Recently, attention has been given to the cognitive processing of aversive 
emotional, or threat-related, information. Although investigations have often 
focused on anxiety disordered individuals, it is suggested that examination of 
"normal" individuals with varying levels of anxiety will increase the 
understanding of the cognitive processing of aversive emotional, or threat- 
related, information. It has been hypothesized that high anxious individuals 
exhibit an attentional bias toward threat-related emotional information. The 
response of low anxious individuals to threat-related information is unclear. 
Som e evidence suggests that non-anxiety disordered individuals employ a 
m echanism  that inhibits or interferes with the processing of threat-related, 
emotional information.
The current study exam ines the cognitive processing of aversive 
emotional, or threat-related, information using a  lexical decision task  (LDT). 
The LDT, which requires subjects to decide if a  letter string is or is not a  word, 
h as  examined cognitive processing of nonemotional information a s  well as  
aversive emotional, or threat-related, information. In the current study, 94 
subjects with differing anxiety levels, indexed by the STAI, responded to a 
computer-driven LDT. The LDT included 384 trials consisting of an attention 
capturing plus (+) sign followed by a  prime word which w as replaced by a 
target letter string. Subjects indicated whether the target letter string 
represented a  word in the English language by pressing keys on a  computer 
keyboard. The design of the study involved a  2 x 4 within- 
subjects variation of target word emotionality (emotional, nonemotional),
vii
and the relationship between the prime and target words (emotional prime 
unrelated to target [e.g. STUPID-BEATEN], nonemotional prime unrelated to 
target [e.g. CRADLE-BEATEN], prime related to target [e.g. ABUSED- 
BEATEN], and prime identical to target [e.g. BEATEN-BEATEN]). Word 
length and familiarity were matched between categories. Emotionality of 
words and sem antic relatedness was determined by pilot subjects. Results 
indicated general support for the existence of a  mechanism that appears to 
compete, inhibit, or interfere with the processing of emotional information. 
High and low anxious individuals exhibited differential patterns of the 
hypothesized inhibition. Results also indicated greater interference of 
processing social threat in comparison to physical threat or nonemotional 
targets.
INTRODUCTION
Recent theories suggest that individuals with emotional disorders such 
a s  depressive and anxiety disorders selectively attend to information that is 
congruent with the predominant mood (see Logan & Goetsch, 1993;
Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1988 for reviews). It has been 
hypothesized that this attentional bias may be involved in the etiology and 
m aintenance of the emotional disorder. Although not without debate, an 
attentional bias toward threat-related information has been docum ented for 
anxiety disordered individuals (Logan & Goetsch, 1993; Eysenck, Mogg,
May, Richards, & Mathews, 1991; Williams et al., 1988). Clinically, the 
phenom enon is observed when the anxious individual is hypervigilant to 
anxiety-producing, or threat-related stimuli. A snake phobic individual, for 
example, may be hypervigilant to long objects on the ground that appear to 
be snake-like in shape or movement. A social phobic individual may be 
hypervigilant to any signs of negative evaluation in the faces or body posture 
of others. In addition to hypervigilance to threat-related stimuli, anxiety 
disordered individuals often exhibit a  tendency to interpret ambiguous stimuli 
a s  threatening or anxiety-producing (Eysenck, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1987; 
Mathews, Richards & Eysenck, 1989). The social phobic individual may 
interpret a  yawning supervisor a s  clear evidence that the conversation is 
boring.
It is generally accepted that the identification of anxiety-producing, or 
threat-related, stimuli is associated with increased arousal which is 
associated  with increased hypervigilance for anxiety-producing, or
1
2threat-related stimuli (Mathews, Richards, & Eysenck, 1989; Ohman, 1988). 
Ohman (1988) has pointed out that the association between increased 
arousal and increased hypervigilance may be beneficial for survival. O nce a  
potentially threatening stimulus is perceived, increased arousal "readies" the 
physiological system  to prepare for "fight or flight". Increased hypervigilance 
"prompts" the perceptual system  to scan the environment for evidence to 
confirm and identify the potentially threatening stimulus.
For the anxiety-disordered individual however, the cycle of attentional 
bias toward threat-related information, increased arousal, and increased 
hypervigilance to threat-related information can becom e dysfunctional due to 
the inability to reduce hypervigilance and the potential interpretation of 
am biguous stimuli a s  threatening. In contrast to anxiety-disordered 
individuals, low anxious individuals do not appear to exhibit an attentional 
bias towards threat-related information. It is important to understand how low 
anxious individuals respond to threat-related information. This is especially 
relevant if the desired treatment outcome goal for anxiety-disordered 
individuals is to change their hypervigilance into a  pattern of attention 
exhibited by low anxious individuals.
Som e theorists have suggested  that low anxious individuals are able to 
inhibit responding to threatening information, similar to the notion of 
perceptual defense (Dixon, 1981 for a  review). Recent evidence has 
supported the existence of a  mechanism that interferes or inhibits the 
processing of threat-related information (Fox, 1994; Jackson & Geer, 1993b). 
In fact, low anxious individuals have been found to exhibit a  bias away from 
threat-related information (Williams et al., 1988). One m eans of investigating 
the differential responding for threat-related and neutral, or nonemotional,
3information has been the examination of the cognitive processing of threat- 
related, emotional information. The current study utilizes a  lexical decision 
task (LDT) from cognitive psychology experiments.
The LDT, which requires subjects to decide if a  letter string is or is not a 
word in the English language, has successfully been used to examine 
cognitive processing of nonemotional information and recently has been 
used to examine aversive emotional, or threat-related, information (Hill & 
Kemp-Wheeler, 1989a; 1989b; Jackson & Geer, 1993b; Neely, 1990). 
Research involving nonemotional stimuli in the LDT indicates that subjects 
respond faster to target words which are primed by semantically related 
prime words (e.g. NURSE-DOCTOR) rather than unrelated prime words (e.g. 
CHAIR-DOCTOR). The facilitation of responding due to the relationship 
between the prime and target stimuli is referred to a s  the facilitory priming 
effect.
R esearchers have also found evidence of this facilitory priming effect 
when prime words and target words were emotionally, but not semantically, 
related (e.g. FATAL-CRUEL) (Hill & Kemp-Wheeler, 1989b; Jackson & Geer, 
1993b; Kemp-Wheeler & Hill, 1991). This facilitory priming effect w as not 
found when the prime and target words were both semantically and 
emotionally related (e.g. FATAL-DEATH) (Jackson & Geer, 1993b). It w as 
suggested  that this lack of semantic priming when both prime and target 
words were emotional was due to an inhibitory mechanism operating within a 
semantic network. In particular, it w as suggested that activation of the 
meaning of the stimuli, physiological arousal w as increased and then 
inhibited. They proposed that the inhibition necessarily inhibited the 
meaning and interfered, delayed, or inhibited responding to the stimulus.
4Based on these  suggestions, they concluded that the hypothesized inhibition 
mechanism reduced the facilitory priming effect of semantically related 
emotional words.
This study was designed to investigate the cognitive processing of 
aversive emotional, or threat-related, information within a  priming lexical 
decision task paradigm. This study w as also designed to examine individual 
differences in state and trait anxiety for their effects upon responding to 
emotional and non-emotional stimuli. Because recent data indicated that 
differing levels of anxiety are associated with differential motor functioning 
(Jackson & Geer, 1993a) and this cognitive task requires a  motor response 
a s  the indicator of cognitive functioning, the current investigation uses motor 
responding a s  a  covariate in the analysis of data. Using motor responding as  
a  covariate allows the examination of differences in responding to emotional 
and nonemotional stimuli due to state and trait anxiety with a  more precise 
m easurem ent of cognitive processing. The following discussion reviews the 
terminology, theories, and research relevant to the current tasks and 
hypothesized inhibitory mechanism. The cognitive task will be reviewed first 
followed by a  review of the motor task and predictions for individual 
differences.
Cognitive Task
Predictions for the priming lexical decision task are based on theories 
derived from network system  theory (Anderson & Bower, 1973; Bower, 1981; 
Collins & Loftus, 1975). Predictions for the effects of aversive emotional 
information within a  priming lexical decision task are derived from theories of 
emotion and cognition (Williams et al., 1988) a s  well a s  previous research
5efforts (Fox, 1994; Hill & Kemp-Wheeler, 1989a; 1989b; Jackson & Geer, 
1993b). The following is a  brief discussion of the terminology, research, and 
theories involved in determining hypotheses concerning the cognitive task.
Network System Theory
The current investigation used a  network system theory and an 
information processing approach a s  frameworks for understanding cognitive 
processing. Network system s such a s  those described by Anderson and 
Bower (1973) and Collins and Loftus (1975) are heuristically valuable to the 
study of cognition. These frameworks were expanded in the network theory 
proposed by Bower (1981) which unifies cognitive and emotion processing. 
The information processing approach (IPA) has also proven useful a s  a  
framework for investigations of cognitive performance (Anderson, 1990).
The IPA assum es that external and internal stimuli are perceived by a 
mental system  which then cognitively processes the stimuli. According to 
network system theory, information is stored a s  nodes which may be 
processed, stored, or brought into aw areness. Awareness refers to the 
mental sta te  where information enters consciousness. Nodes are believed to 
have aw areness thresholds which refer to the amount of activation required 
to bring a  node of information into aw areness.
As a  m eans of bringing information into aw areness, network system 
theory assum es that information stored as  nodes are activated. Activation, 
often equated to neural stimulation, serves to decrease  the node’s 
aw areness threshold, making the node more accessible to consciousness. 
Activation then spreads to nodes linked to the activated node by 
associations, such a s  similarity of meaning. This process is known a s  the
6"spreading of activation." The subsequent activation of linked nodes is 
believed to be of a  lesser value than the activation of the original node. The 
subthreshold activation of associated nodes is referred to a s  "priming." The 
spreading of activation and priming processes are assum ed to occur 
automatically and without volition or aw areness. It is notable that in the IPA 
framework, the terms perception and cognition do not imply aw areness, or 
rather, perception and cognition do not require aw areness.
In the current investigation, network theory serves a s  a  framework for 
examining the relationship between cognition and  emotion. Use of network 
theory as  a  framework rather than a  model has been recommended (Williams 
et al., 1988). As a  framework, the theory can be used to discuss phenom ena 
rather than predict it. Terminology from network theory such a s  the storage of 
information a s  nodes, spreading of activation and priming can be valuable for 
discussing the relationship between cognition and emotion. According to 
Bower (1981) nodes can represent emotions and information. Bower also 
suggests that terms such a s  spreading activation and priming are applicable 
to both emotions and cognitive information. The placement of emotion within 
a  network system  has important implications for the linking of emotional 
stimuli and emotional physiological arousal.
Emotion within a  Network System
In Bower's theory (1981) emotions are represented a s  nodes within the 
sam e network a s  nonemotional information. Similar to other nodes, emotion 
nodes are associated, or linked, to other nodes. Emotion nodes may be 
linked to nodes representing memories that occurred when that emotion was 
aroused a s  well a s  to nodes representing information that is associated with
7that emotion. In this theory, the emotion node is also associated with 
physiological responding and behaviors. B ecause emotion nodes are 
susceptible to the spread of activation, mood may serve to prime nodes 
linked to the emotion. This conceptualization provides the rationale for 
Bower's theory of state-dependent learning and retrieval. This theory 
suggests that information has a  greater likelihood of being recalled when the 
current mood state is congruent to the mood state present when the 
information w as stored. Although research has provided inconsistent results 
for m ood-dependent learning and retrieval, this theory continues to guide 
researchers (Mathews, 1988; Warburton, 1988).
Although many network theories, such a s  Bower's (1981), have briefly 
exam ined the interaction between emotional stimuli and emotional 
responding, few theories have examined the the exact nature of the 
relationship between emotional information and physiological emotional 
responding. Lang and his colleagues (Lang, 1979; Lang, Kozak, Miller, 
Levin, & McLean, 1980) offer a  bio-informational network theory which 
directly ad d resses  the relationship between emotional information and 
emotional responding.
In Lang's bio-informational network model, information is stored a s  three 
types of propositions. Propositions can be conceptualized a s  similar to 
nodes or storage se ts  of information. First, stimuli which precede or occur 
with the concept are stored a s  stimulus propositions. Second, behavioral 
responses associated with the concept are stored a s  response propositions. 
Finally, meaning propositions, which are semantic in nature, are the result of 
combinations of other propositions. Meaning propositions define the 
significance of the concept. Lang proposes that information is brought into
8aw areness/consciousness by activating these  highly related propositions. 
Activating a  sufficient number of propositions results in an emotion cluster 
being activated a s  a  single unit.
Lang suggests that the activation of meaning propositions necessita tes 
the activation of associated response propositions. Behavioral responses 
associated with a  concept's meaning are fundamental to the meaning 
proposition and are automatically activated in parallel to m eaning and 
stimulus propositions. Research investigating the automatic activation of 
emotional responding a s  indexed by physiological m easures supports 
Lang's theory (Mathews et al., 1989; Ohman, 1988).
Mathews et al. (1989) investigated the relationship between word 
emotionality and physiological arousal. Their study utilized hom ophones, 
words with different spellings and m eanings but pronounced the sam e (e.g. 
die/dye), and used skin conductance a s  a  m easure of physiological 
responding. Results indicated that skin conductance changes were 
correlated with presentation of negative emotional stimuli. This correlation 
w as significant across subject groups of clinically anxious, recovered 
anxious, and non-anxious controls. Ohman (1988) has also found an 
association between the presentation of emotional stimuli and increased 
physiological arousal, as  indexed by skin conductance changes. Results 
from th ese  studies support Lang's bio-informational theory wherein meaning 
propositions are necessarily associated with response propositions. In other 
words, automatic activation of physiological responding is associated  with 
the perception of emotional stimuli.
Ohman (1988) d iscusses the association between emotional responding 
and perception of emotional stimuli and the necessity and importance of a
9preattentive, or automatic, mechanism for detecting emotionality. The 
automatic activation of emotional responding is an adaptive behavior when 
an emotion provoking stimulus is present. Overactivation of emotional 
responding however is not an adaptive behavior. Hypervigilance to 
emotional stimuli and overreaction of emotional responding is considered 
dysfunctional and is described as  a  possible basis for several mental 
disorders (Williams et al., 1988; Barlow, 1988). The m eans of stopping, 
inhibiting, or somehow decreasing automatic emotional arousal when an 
individual perceives an emotional stimulus is vital to the individual's ability to 
function. Mechanisms which prevent or decrease  overactivation of 
emotional, physiological responding are rarely discussed in theories of 
emotion and cognition. Most theories, such a s  Lang's theory, are unclear 
concerning the termination of the physiological arousal. Ohman (1988), 
however, offers hypotheses concerning the termination of automatic 
physiological arousal to prevent this overactivation of arousal when an 
individual perceives an emotional stimulus.
Although it may be suggested that automatically activated physiological 
arousal passively decays similarly to the passive decay of activation 
proposed by selective attention models (e.g. Kahneman & Triesman, 1984), 
Ohman suggests that an inhibitory mechanism operates to actively inhibit the 
arousal. Specifically, Ohman proposes that the perceptual system scan s  the 
environment for emotionally meaningful stimuli and gives priority to 
processing such material by a  procedure often referred to a s  automatic 
vigilance. Automatic vigilance to emotionally meaningful stimuli has also 
been proposed by several other theorists (Bargh, Litt, Pratto, & Spielman, 
1988; Pratto & John, 1991). This procedure serves to speed  responding to
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emotional stimuli and activate nodes associated by emotional or sem antic 
meaning. Ohman, however, also postulates the existence of an evaluating 
mechanism within the network system which determ ines the necessity of 
physiological arousal. If the arousal is unnecessary, an inhibitory 
mechanism actively inhibits the physiological arousal. The implications of 
this inhibition on the priming of emotionally or semantically related nodes are 
speculative. Information may be gained by reviewing the work of other 
researchers (e.g. Dagenbach, Carr, & Barnhardt, 1990; Fox, 1993a; 1994; 
Tipper & Driver, 1988; Yee, 1991) who have also proposed inhibitory 
m echanism s working within the network system.
Most of these  researchers did not examine the inhibition of emotional 
arousal or emotional stimuli, but merely the inhibition of nonemotional 
information for functions such a s  aiding selective attention and decreasing 
processing capacity allotted to irrelevant or distracting stimuli. In the 
following section, investigations of an inhibitory process operating on 
nonemotional information within a  network system  are examined a s  well a s  
investigations involving inhibitory process operating on emotional 
information.
Inhibition of Nonemotional Stimuli within a Network System
Using a  variety of cognitive paradigms, researchers have investigated the 
possibility of inhibitory m echanism s operating on nonemotional stimuli within 
a network system. Research conducted by Tipper and his colleagues 
(Allport, Tipper, & Chimel, 1985; Tipper, 1985; Tipper & Cranston, 1985; 
Tipper & Driver, 1988; Tipper, Weaver, Kirkpatrick, & Lewis, 1991), 
Dagenbach, et al. (1990), and Yee (1991) supports the existence of an
11
inhibitory mechanism that aids in selective attention by decreasing attention 
given to irrelevant or distracting stimuli. In each of these  studies, inhibition 
refers to a  slowing of expected reaction time. When reaction time is 
significantly slower than expected, the stimulus is said to have been 
"inhibited" or that som e process has interfered with processing the stimulus.
Tipper and his colleagues report that the inhibitory effects of consciously 
ignoring information aids selective attention. In each of these studies, 
subjects were asked to respond to a target while ignoring one or more 
distractors. The process of ignoring the distractors, or inhibiting the attention 
given to the distractors, should result in facilitation of responding to the target. 
If inhibition occurred, reaction times should be slowed when the target w as 
the sam e a s  the distractor in a  previous trial. Results indicated that in 
conditions where the target w as the sam e a s  the distractor, responding to the 
target w as slowed. This slowing was accepted a s  evidence for an inhibitory 
process that interfered or competed with activation of the target word (Tipper, 
1985; Tipper & Cranston, 1985). Tipper (1985) also examined the effects of 
an ignored distractor stimulus of one trial on the following trial's target 
stimulus. This study found the inhibitory effect when the target and distractor 
pair were not identical but were semantically related line drawings, such a s  
drawings of a  dog and a cat. Tipper and Driver (1988) found this inhibitory 
effect when the target and distractor pair were semantically related words 
and line drawings, such a s  the word dog and the drawing of a  cat. Hoffman 
and McMillan (1985) replicated this inhibitory effect using a  priming lexical 
decision task. Subjects were instructed to ignore the prime words and 
respond to the target letter string. R esponses were slower when the ignored 
prime w as semantically related, rather than unrelated, to the target word.
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This finding is particularly important because the results directly oppose the 
hypothesized facilitory priming effect for semantically related words. The 
results of this study suggest that intentional ignoring of stimuli interferes with 
spread of activation processes.
Neill (1977; Neill & Westberry, 1987) and Lowe (1985) examined 
inhibitory effects of ignoring in the Stroop task. Although there are several 
different versions, the Stroop task  usually consists of a  list of five or six color 
nam es printed in a  differing color ink (e.g. RED printed in green ink). The 
subject is required to name the color of ink used to print each word. Results 
indicated that response times were slower when the ink color w as the 
response to be ignored, the color name, in the previous trial than when the 
ink color was not the color nam e in the previous trial. For example, in the first 
trial the word BLUE may be printed in yellow ink and in the following trial the 
word GREEN may be printed in blue ink. B ecause the subject w as required 
to ignore, or inhibit, the "blue" response in the first trial to give the correct 
response of "yellow", responding "blue" in the following trial is slowed. It can 
be said that processing and responding to "blue" in the second trial has been 
interfered with, or inhibited.
Research conducted by Yee (1991) indicates that even ignored stimuli 
presented outside the area of focused attention are processed and are 
associated with inhibitory effects of related target stimuli. In Yee's (1991) 
study, subjects were required to respond to geometric shapes while words 
were presented in the periphery a s  distractors. Words that were semantically 
related to the distractor words were then presented in a lexical decision task. 
Yee found that words semantically related to words which were presented a s  
distractors yielded slower lexical decision times than did words not related to
13
the distractors. It was suggested that the distractor words were ignored, 
activation w as inhibited, to facilitate responding to the geometric shapes.
The process of ignoring distractor stimuli inhibited, or interfered with, the 
spread of activation to semantically related words and resulted in slowed 
lexical decision times. This evidence supports the notion that selective 
attention does not eliminate the processing of peripheral stimuli and that 
inhibitory processes are important to the focusing of attention.
Inhibition of Emotional Stimuli within a  Network System
Fox (1994) investigated the effects of this inhibitory process on emotional 
information. In particular, she  examined threat-related information and 
grouped individuals according to state and trait anxiety. She also defined a  
unique group of individuals who scored low on anxiety but theoretically 
responded to stressors with high anxiety behaviorally and physiologically 
(Weinberger, 1990; Weinberger, Schwartz, & Davidson, 1979). She 
identified this group by low scores on the Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety 
Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970) who were also 
high scorers on the Marlowe-Crowne Scale of Social Desirability (Crowne & 
Marlowe, 1960). T hese subjects were classified by W einberger (1990) and 
Fox (1994) as  "repressors" (REP). Fox (1994) examined the interaction 
between high anxiety, low anxiety, and REP subjects and inhibition using a  
num ber identification task which displayed distractor words above and below 
the number and a  lexical decision task which followed each num ber trial. In 
som e trials, the lexical decision task consisted of a  word that w as previously 
used a s  a  distractor word for the previous number identification task.
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She found that REP subjects dem onstrated slower reaction times when 
the "inhibited" word was emotional, or threat-related, rather than 
nonemotional. In addition, the amount of inhibition for emotional words w as 
greater for the REP group than for high anxiety or low anxiety groups. Low 
anxiety subjects also dem onstrated the inhibitory effect for emotional words, 
but this inhibition did not significantly differ (e<.07) from their inhibition of 
nonemotional words. B ecause of the low number of subjects in this study 
(N=10 per group), the ability to detect "inhibition" may be limited by problems 
with statistical power. B ecause of this robust finding of slowed reaction times 
to threat-related information, Fox suggests that ineffective inhibition of threat- 
related information may be causally associated with an attentional bias 
toward threat-related information in anxious individuals. Fox termed this 
phenom enon a s  the "defective inhibition hypothesis."
It is important to point out that in each of the above experiments 
concerning nonemotional and emotional stimuli, inhibition w as found to 
"spread" to semantically related stimuli. The inhibition of responding w as not 
limited to only the ignored word, but also affected words semantically related 
to the ignored word. Responding to stimuli semantically related to ignored or 
suppressed  information w as inhibited. This finding cannot readily be 
explained by current models of semantic memory or selective attention 
without modifications. Semantic memory and selective attention models 
have, however, successfully explained data resulting from cognitive tasks 
paradigm s investigating relationships between stimuli. One such paradigm 
is the priming lexical decision task which is utilized in the current 
investigation. The following is a  review of consistently reported results for 
nonemotional stimuli used within the lexical decision task paradigm.
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Lexical Decision Task and Nonemotional Stimuli
The priming lexical decision task (LDT) has been widely used in research 
examining cognitive processes such a s  the spread of activation, storage, and 
retrieval of nonemotional information. This task has also been successfully 
used to examine the associative networks among nonemotional stimuli. 
B ecause of its successful history of studying these phenomenon, the LDT 
w as chosen a s  the cognitive task for the current investigation. Both semantic 
and repetition priming tasks are used in this investigation.
The priming LDT consists of multiple trials; each trial contains two stimuli. 
The first stimuli presented is the prime and the second is the target letter 
string. The procedure for each trial is as  follows. Each trial is initiated by the 
presentation of a  fixture point or ready signal to prepare the subject to focus 
his/her attention. The fixture point is replaced by a  prime which remains 
present for a  fixed duration of time. The prime is then replaced by a  target 
letter string. Letter strings may be words or nonwords. Nonwords are usually 
pronounceable and orthographically legal. Nonwords are generally formed 
by changing one letter, often a  vowel (Antos, 1979; Neely, 1977). Subjects 
respond to the target letter string by (a) deciding if the target is a  word or 
nonword and (b) indicating their decision by pressing buttons on a  response 
box or pressing keys on a  computer keyboard. This response com pletes one 
trial of the LDT. After a  brief period another trial begins. Some researchers 
have modified this procedure to investigate specific theoretical questions. 
Modified procedures include differences in prime duration (Neely, 1977), 
differences in the amount of time between the onset of the prime and the 
onset of the target (Favreau & Segalowitz, 1983; Neely, 1977), the prime may 
require a  lexical decision to be made (den Heyer, Briand, & Dannenbring,
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1983), the fixture point, prime, and target may appear simultaneously 
(Seidenberg, W aters, Sanders, & Langer, 1984), a s  well a s  others (see 
Neely, 1990 for a  review).
Regardless of the exact procedure, research using the LDT has 
consistently indicated that when the prime and target word are semantically 
related (e.g. DOCTOR-NURSE) lexical decision times to the target are faster 
than when the prime and target are unrelated (e.g. BUTTER-NURSE). This 
effect is known as  the facilitory semantic priming effect, or semantic priming. 
Other forms of semantic priming include grammatical, syntactical, and 
categorical priming. These forms of semantic priming have also been found 
to yield a  facilitory priming effect (Neely,1990). It is hypothesized that 
activation of the node representing the prime word spreads to other 
associatively linked nodes, regardless of how the nodes are associated. This 
subsequent activation lowers the aw areness thresholds of linked nodes.
Thus if the target word is represented by an associatively linked node, its 
threshold is lowered and will require fewer perceptual cues to be activated 
into aw areness. When the target is associatively linked to the prime, the 
individual m akes a  faster lexical decision than when the target is not linked to 
the prime. This facilitory priming effect has also been found for semantically 
unrelated words which shared the sam e emotional valence and is referred to 
a s  emotional priming (Hill & Kemp-Wheeler, 1989b). The use of emotional 
words within a  LDT paradigm, however, has not always provided the 
expected facilitory emotional and semantic priming effect (Jackson & Geer, 
1993b).
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Lexical Decision Task and Emotional Stimuli
Hill and Kemp-Wheeler (1989a; 1989b; Kemp-Wheeler & Hill, 1991) have 
examined the role of aversive emotional stimuli within the LDT paradigm. 
These researchers compared lexical decision times for emotional target 
words primed with (a) unrelated emotional words, (b) related nonemotional 
words, and (c) unrelated nonemotional words. Also com pared were 
nonemotional target words primed with (a) related nonemotional words, (b) 
unrelated nonemotional words, and (c) a  row of X's. The LDT paradigms 
used contained both supraliminal (Hill and Kemp-Wheeler, 1989b) and 
subliminal (Kemp-Wheeler & Hill, 1991) presentation of primes. In each of 
their studies, Hill and Kemp-Wheeler found evidence for both semantic 
priming and emotional priming. Semantic priming w as described a s  the 
facilitation of lexical decision times due to the sem antic relationship between 
the prime and target words. Semantic priming w as examined by comparing 
the condition of nonemotional primes unrelated to emotional targets (e.g. 
JACKET-GUILT) and the condition of nonemotional primes semantically 
related to emotional targets (e.g. CHAMBER-TORTURE). Emotional priming 
w as described as  the facilitation of lexical decision times due to the 
emotional relationship of the prime and target words. Emotional priming was 
exam ined by comparing the condition of nonemotional primes unrelated to 
emotional targets (e.g. JACKET-GUILT) and the condition of emotional 
primes semantically unrelated to emotional targets (e.g. DISEASE- 
AMBUSH).
Semantic priming is predicted by network theory and the notion of 
spreading activation. When the prime word is activated, the activation 
spreads to associatively linked nodes. B ecause the two words are related in
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meaning it is believed that the target word is associatively linked to the prime 
word. The subthreshold activation of the target word lowers the amount of 
activation required to bring the target word into aw areness, thus facilitory 
lexical decision times. Emotional priming is predicted by Bower's theory 
(1981) which suggests that emotions exist a s  nodes. Although the emotional 
prime and target words are not semantically linked nodes, they are linked to 
a more general aversive emotion node through which activation can spread. 
When the prime word is activated, the activation spreads to the general 
emotion node and then spreads to other nodes associatively linked to that 
emotion node, regardless of the semantic relationship between the emotional 
prime and target words. Hill and Kemp-Wheeler (1989b) also note that 
emotional priming could result from a  form of semantic priming, such a s  
categorical priming, due to the commonality of the aversive emotion between 
the words.
Jackson and G eer (1993b) also examined the role of aversive emotional 
stimuli within the LDT paradigm with the addition of a  condition for 
semantically related emotional prime and target words. In this study lexical 
decision times for emotional and nonemotional target words primed with 
emotional and nonemotional words which were either related or unrelated to 
the target word were compared. Consistent with Hill and Kemp-Wheeler's 
(1989b) data, Jackson & G eer (1993b) found general evidence for semantic 
and emotional priming. Lexical decision times for target words were faster 
when the target was primed with a  semantically related word rather than an 
unrelated word. Lexical decision times for emotional target words were faster 
when the target was primed with an unrelated emotional prime rather than an 
unrelated nonemotional prime.
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In contrast to these general findings, Jackson and G eer (1993b) found a 
lack of sem antic priming when both the prime and target words were 
emotional. This result contradicts predictions m ade by the notion of 
spreading activation. Spread of activation theory predicts that lexical 
decision times for a  target (e.g. NURSE) will be faster when the target is 
primed with a  semantically related word (e.g. DOCTOR) in comparison to an 
unrelated word (e.g. BUTTER). In Jackson and G eer's (1993b) study lexical 
decision times were not faster when an emotional prime w as related, rather 
than unrelated, to the emotional target. These results were explained as  
providing evidence for an inhibitory mechanism operating within a  semantic 
network. It was suggested that perception of emotional stimuli and activation 
of emotional arousal results in an inhibition response. This inhibition 
response serves to inhibit the emotional arousal a s  well a s  the meaning 
representation, or node. This inhibition then spreads to associatively related 
nodes. The proposed inhibitory mechanism com petes, or interferes with the 
activation of the sam e nodes. The competing, or interfering, p rocesses result 
in a  distinct lack of speeding for lexical decision times even though the prime 
w as semantically related to the target word.
The theory of an inhibitory process described by Jackson and G eer 
(1993b) would also predict that the prime word which elicited the arousal and 
responding inhibitory process would be inhibited and the lexical decision 
times to emotional targets primed by them selves, a s  in repetition priming, 
would not receive the sam e facilitating benefits observed in repetition priming 
of nonemotional stimuli. The repetition priming LDT paradigm com pares 
conditions in which the target word (e.g. NURSE) is primed by the sam e word 
(e.g. NURSE) compared to the condition in which the target word
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(e.g. NURSE) is primed by a  different unrelated word (e.g. BUTTER). The 
facilitory priming effect in the repetition priming LDT refers to the decrease  in 
lexical decision time due to the use of the target word a s  the prime. Similar to 
the priming LDT paradigm, repetition priming has been widely used to study 
cognitive processing of nonemotional information.
Repetition Priming with Nonemotional Stimuli
Several variations of the repetition priming task have been designed that 
examine the cognitive processing of nonemotional information. Words may 
be repeated throughout a  single experiment to examine inter-item lag upon 
memory (e.g. Karayanidis, Andrews, Ward, & McConaghy, 1991) or identical 
words may be used a s  both the prime and target word (e.g. Forster & Davis, 
1984). The current investigation utilizes the latter paradigm. Identical words, 
therefore identical meanings, will be used a s  both the prime and target 
stimuli. Facilitation of lexical decision time occurs when a  target word is 
primed with the identical word rather than a different word. Researchers 
have hypothesized that this facilitory priming effect results from enhanced 
lexical access  and/or episodic memory (Forster & Davis, 1984; Jacoby, 1983; 
Karayanidis et al., 1991; Scarborough, Gerard, & Cortese, 1979).
Enhanced lexical access  refers to the process of activating the prime word 
which lowers the aw areness threshold for subsequent presentations of the 
sam e word a s  a  target, thus facilitating responding to the target. Episodic 
memory refers to the existence of a  memory trace of the prime word which is 
re-activated by the presentation of the target word, thus facilitating 
responding to the target. Recent evidence indicates that both enhanced
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lexical access  and episodic memory processes operate in the repetition 
priming effect (Karayanidis et al., 1991).
Previous research has not examined the utility of the repetition paradigm 
for investigating cognitive processing of emotional information. It is unclear if 
the inhibition of responding also occurs in repetition priming of emotional 
stimuli. It appears that the repetition priming task serves a s  a  more stringent 
test of possible inhibitory mechanisms for two specific reasons. First, 
because  the semantic relationship between the prime and target is 
unambiguous, the words are identical, the semantic relationship between 
them is a s  simple a s  possible w hereas in a  non-repetition LDT, the semantic 
relationship between the prime and target is more complex. Thus, the 
processing of emotional and nonemotional information can be examined in 
the repetition priming paradigm with less confounding information than in the 
non-repetition LDT. Second, any inhibitory mechanism must override 
facilitation of responding that occurs a s  a  result of enhanced lexical access  
and/or episodic memory in the repetition priming task.
The repetition priming paradigm also allows the examination of individual 
differences in responding to emotional and nonemotional information and the 
inhibition of emotional stimuli within a  network system. In particular, 
individual differences of state and trait anxiety which have the potential of 
effecting an inhibitory mechanism can be examined in this paradigm. Since 
the sam e individual differences may also effect motor response times 
(Jackson & Geer, 1993a) and may lead to erroneous interpretation of 
individual differences in cognitive response times, a  brief discussion of this 
topic follows.
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Individual Differences in Motor Movement
S tate and trait anxiety have been hypothesized to be individual 
differences which may account for variance in the cognitive processing of 
emotional information (Williams et al., 1988). It is hypothesized that state and 
trait anxiety may affect lexical decision times for emotional stimuli and 
inhibition of priming. Results from the priming lexical decision task, however, 
reflect more than cognitive processing of information. Response times for the 
LDT are comprised of cognitive reaction times as  well as  motor movement 
times. To attribute differences in cognitive processing to individual 
differences it must be assum ed that the motor movement times do not also 
vary due to the individual differences. If motor movement varies a s  a  function 
of the individual differences it may confound the results observed in the 
cognitive task.
Jackson and G eer (1993a) found that state and trait anxiety varied 
systematically with motor movement times. The motor task in this study 
involved executing the exact response, pressing a  key on a  keyboard, used 
for the LDT. Individuals with low state and low trait anxiety responded to the 
motor task  faster than subjects with high state/low trait, low state/high trait, or 
high state/high trait anxiety. These results suggest the need to partial motor 
task  times from the cognitive task prior to examining the effects of individuals 
differences, such a s  state and trait anxiety, upon cognitive processing. The 
current study employs this strategy to replicate and extend the various 
research suggesting the need for such controls.
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Motor Task
Many theorists have examined the interaction between individual 
differences in anxiety and performance on motor tasks. These theories, 
however, tend to include a  variety of terms which are then generalized to 
other, nonequivalent terms. Before reviewing theories concerning the effects 
of anxiety upon cognitive and motor performance it is necessary  to briefly 
exam ine the definitions of commonly used terms. The following discussion 
outlines the usage of these terms in respect to the current investigation.
S tress
McGrath (1970) has described s tress a s  an imbalance between the 
dem and of a  situation and the capability of the individual. This dem and can 
either be greater than capability, a s  in overload, or less than capability, a s  in 
underload. Borrowing from McGrath's definition, physiological and 
psychological stress may be differentiated. Physiological s tress is described 
a s  an imbalance between physiological capability and dem and. Injury, 
illness, and physical fatigue are perhaps the most common catalysts for 
physiological stress. In comparison, psychological s tress is described a s  an 
imbalance between psychological capability and demand. Mood state, 
num ber of perceived stressors, and mental fatigue are perhaps the most 
common catalysts for psychological stress. In general, stress does not 
require the perception of demand, the perception of capability, or the 
perception of an imbalance between the two. If however the dem and, 
capability, or imbalance are perceived, it is implied that the individual has 
m ade an accurate assessm ent of these  features.
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Anxiety
In contrast to stress, anxiety requires and results from perceptions of 
dem and, perceptions of capability, perceptions of the imbalance between the 
two, or any combination of these  three. Two components differentiate stress 
and anxiety. First is the accuracy of the perceived imbalance between 
dem and and capability. Specifically, anxiety can result from inaccurate 
perceptions. Inaccurate perceptions may be based upon either ambiguous 
stimuli or misinterpretations of stimuli. Second, anxiety can result from a  
singular form of imbalance between dem and and capability: dem and is 
perceived a s  greater than capability.
S tate and trait anxiety.
Anxiety is often viewed a s  existing a s  a  state or trait of an individual. 
Spielberger (1966) conceptualized state anxiety a s  an emotional sta te  of 
apprehension and tension associated with autonomic arousal. S tate anxiety 
is believed to be a  transient form of anxiety that is responsive to situational 
stimuli. Spielberger conceptualized trait anxiety a s  a  tendency to perceive 
stimuli a s  threatening and respond with state anxiety. Individuals high in trait 
anxiety display high state  anxiety more often than individuals low in trait 
anxiety. Trait anxiety does not necessarily suggest an underlying, constant 
level of anxiety, but rather a  tendency to perceive stimuli either a s  an social 
or physical threat, resulting in state anxiety.
Somatic and cognitive anxiety.
Both state and trait anxiety can be further classified into somatic and 
cognitive anxiety (Martens, Vealey, and Burton, 1990). Somatic anxiety
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refers to the physiological aspects of anxiety. Specifically, effects of 
autonomic arousal associated with the experience of anxiety are classified as  
somatic anxiety. These effects include increased heart rate, dizziness, 
nausea, muscle tension, and sweating. Cognitive anxiety refers to the covert 
aspects  of anxiety. Worry, aversive feelings, and increased misperceptions 
of external and internal stimuli are included a s  covert, or cognitive, aspects. 
Somatic and cognitive anxiety are believed to function independently 
although they covary (Morris, Davis, & Hutchings, 1981). Most individuals 
experience both somatic and cognitive anxiety, although one type may 
represent a  dominant pattern of responding. Neiss (1988; 1990) suggests 
that the dominant anxiety response differs across situations and across 
individuals. It is also possible that som e individuals experience more of one 
type of anxiety than the other. Individual differences in somatic and cognitive 
anxiety may have implications for theories concerning anxiety and 
performance which will be discussed later.
Clinical Anxiety
Clinical anxiety refers to anxiety which is excessive and interferes with an 
individual's ability to function. Use of the term "clinical" implies a  disorder 
which is diagnosable and presumably treatable. A disorder is, by nature, 
dysfunctional. Although most individuals experience temporary s tress and 
even anxiety, clinical anxiety denotes a  pervasive pattern of responding 
which hinders functioning. Cognitive-behavioral treatment of clinical anxiety 
includes topics such a s  thought monitoring, exposure treatment, and anxiety 
monitoring w hereas treatment for stress, often referred to a s  stress
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m anagem ent, may include topics such a s  time managem ent, relaxation, goal 
setting, and communication training.
Arousal
Martens et al. (1990) describe arousal a s  a  state of being activated or 
prepared to act and believe arousal to exist along a  continuum between 
deep sleep and intense excitement. Arousal has often been used 
synonymously with psychological sta tes such a s  anxiety. A review of 
research conducted by Neiss (1988; 1990) however, did not support the 
synonymous usage of arousal and anxiety. Although arousal is associated 
with the experience of anxiety, arousal may also be experienced with a  
variety of other emotions such a s  happiness or anger. The current 
discussion attem pts to avoid the syntactic error of using arousal and anxiety 
synonymously by dividing arousal into physiological and psychological 
com ponents.
Physiological arousal refers to autonomic nervous system  (ANS) arousal. 
Symptoms of ANS arousal include increased heart rate, sweating, and 
constriction of blood vessels, a s  well a s  others. These symptoms are 
believed to prepare the individual for physical action. This preparation for 
action is exemplified in a  "fight or flight" instinct. In anxiety, physiological 
arousal is referred to as  somatic anxiety. Psychological arousal, also 
described a s  emotional arousal, refers to the preparation of mental, or 
cognitive, abilities to act. Symptoms of the activation of mental abilities 
include increased vigilance to emotional stimuli and emotional lability. In 
anxiety, psychological arousal is referred to a s  cognitive anxiety.
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The relation between arousal and cognition has long been debated and 
remains unclear. R esearchers have m ade emphatic claims concerning this 
relationship. Lazarus (1984) suggests that cognition precedes emotional 
arousal w hereas Zajonc (1984) suggests that arousal precedes the 
perception of emotion. The current discussion expresses the view that 
perception is a  result of a  complex physiological system. Within this system, 
psychological emotional arousal may result from interpretation of external or 
internal cues. Physiological arousal may serve as  an internal cue for 
psychological emotional arousal. The current discussion expresses the view 
that both psychological and physiological arousal are physiological in nature, 
i.e. result from biological functioning, and are not necessarily mediated by 
aw areness. Therefore, unless otherwise noted, the term arousal will be used 
in this discussion to refer to physiological arousal. This arousal can be 
associated  with stress or anxiety.
Movement
Movement can be classified in a  variety of ways. Most useful for the 
current discussion is the classification of fine and gross motor movement.
Fine motor movement is described a s  movement requiring small muscle 
control and precision. Typing, handwriting, and threading a  needle are 
exam ples of fine motor movements. In comparison, gross motor m ovements 
require large m uscles and coordination. Kicking a  ball, running, and jumping 
are exam ples of gross motor movements.
28
Perform ance
Performance on tasks is usually m easured by response times, success of 
task  completion, or both. The current discussion is concerned with response 
tim es and investigation of cognitive performance in comparison with motor 
performance rather than success  of task completion. Response times are 
comprised of reaction times and movement times. Reaction times refer to the 
time between presentation of the task stimuli and initiation of movement. 
Reaction times are comprised of premotor reaction times and motor reaction 
times. Premotor reaction times refer to the time between presentation of task 
stimuli and electromyographic (EMG) changes w hereas motor reaction times 
refer to the time between EMG changes and initiation of movement. 
Movement times refer to the time between initiation of movement and 
completion of the task.
Performance is divided into motor performance and cognitive 
performance. Motor performance is readily examined in movement times. 
Most likely, however, cognition also occurs during this time and serves to 
evaluate and revise movement if necessary. The cognitive processing 
involved in movement times is reduced for simple tasks which require few 
movements. Cognitive performance is evidenced in the reaction time portion 
of response times. Determining reaction times is som ew hat elusive due to 
the necessity of motor movement for the recording of a  reaction time. The 
use of a  task requiring the sam e movement a s  the lexical decision task but 
requiring a s  little cognitive processing as  possible allows for the recording of 
a  response time which can be regarded a s  movement time. This movement 
time can then be partialled from response times of tasks requiring greater
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cognitive processing to allow examination of cognitive performance less 
confounded by movement.
Successful task performance is affected by many variables such a s  stress, 
anxiety, arousal, the motor movement required by the task, and the task  
complexity. The combination of these  variables can improve or hinder 
performance. The following discussion highlights theories concerning 
anxiety and performance.
Theories Concerning Arousal. Anxiety, and Performance
Two of the most popular theories describing the relationship between 
arousal, anxiety, and performance are drive theory and the inverted-U 
hypothesis. More recently, cognitive theories, a  catastrophe model, and 
Krane's (1992) model have been proposed to explain this relationship. The 
drive theory w as initially proposed by Hull (1943) and later adapted by 
Spence and Spence (1966) to describe the relationship between arousal 
and performance. It was based  upon the equation: Performance = Habit 
Strength x Drive. Drive theory proposes that increases in arousal are 
associated with poor performance for novel, complex tasks and are 
associated with good performance for simple, overlearned tasks. Regardless 
of task type, these  relationships are believed to be linear. In a review of 
relevant research, Martens (1974) found little support for this theory. He 
commented that drive theory does not incorporate cognitive processing 
which is an important performance variable. Other researchers have 
criticized drive theory's inability to accurately predict performance and its 
disregard for individual differences (e.g. Weinberg, 1979).
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In contrast to drive theory, a  non-linear relationship betw een anxiety and 
performance has been suggested. The inverted-U hypothesis w as originated 
by Yerkes and Dodson (1908) to describe the relationship betw een arousal 
and performance. This hypothesis, commonly known as  the Yerkes-Dodson 
law, has been revised to describe anxiety and performance and proposes 
that best performance is associated with an optimal level of anxiety. For each 
individual, each task has an associated optimal level of anxiety and 
performance is impaired if anxiety is too low or too high. It is believed that 
this optimal level of anxiety varies according to task  complexity and 
familiarity. The optimal level is higher for simple, overleam ed tasks and 
lower for complex, novel tasks. Most research in this area  has utilized an 
induction of state anxiety such a s  being told of failure or threat of shock. 
Results indicate that only anxiety induced by ego-threat (failure), rather than 
physical threat, consistently affects performance (Eysenck, 1983). Som e 
researchers also note that m easurem ents of arousal do not correlate with 
self-reported anxiety (Holyrod, Westbrook, Wolf, & Badhorn, 1978).
Neiss (1988; 1990) claims that the inverted-U hypothesis has little utility 
a s  a  theory because it cannot be refuted. If different motor behaviors have 
different optimal levels of anxiety for best performance, a s  the inverted-U 
theory suggests, nonsignificant research can be explained by claiming that 
anxiety levels that were too low or too high to detect the inverted-U pattern of 
responding. Neiss also concludes that most research supports a  
correlational, but not causal, inverted-U relationship betw een anxiety and 
performance. Landers (1980) noted that the inveried-U hypothesis simply 
describes a  relationship between anxiety and performance without
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hypothesizing why the relationship exists. Several other theories have been 
proposed to explain the relationship.
After observing the relationship between anxiety and performance, a  
cognitive theory of why the relationship exists becam e prominent; one such 
theory w as derived by Weiner (1965; 1966; Weiner & Schneider, 1971). 
Although he attempted to explain the relationship hypothesized in drive 
theory, his ideas are present in current theories. He proposed that 
performance is due to the attributions of successes  and failures. In drive 
theory, better performance is predicted for complex, novel tasks with low 
anxiety states. Weiner proposed that more failures were likely with complex, 
novel tasks and high anxiety sta tes  would increase negative attributions for 
the failure. These negative attributions would impair performance. For 
simple, overleamed tasks, however, high anxiety sta tes  are beneficial.
T hese tasks produce less failures and less opportunity for negative 
attributions which could impair performance. Weiner further suggested that 
individuals had a  predisposition to high or low anxiety s ta tes and that this 
predisposition would affect their attributional style. High anxious individuals, 
in comparison to low anxious individuals, were hypothesized to have 
impaired performance under high state anxiety situations. The impaired 
performance w as believed to be due to the predisposition of high anxious 
individuals to make negative attributions.
Wine (1971) derived a similar theory to explain the results of the inverted- 
U hypothesis. He also believed that individuals predisposed to high or low 
anxiety required different state anxiety levels for optimal performance. He 
proposed that low anxious individuals concentrate on task-relevant stimuli 
and perform well during high sta te  anxiety. High anxious individuals
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concentrated on task-irrelevant stimuli, such a s  self-deprecatory thoughts, 
and performed poorly during high state anxiety. While during low state 
anxiety, low anxiety individuals becam e "bored", concentrated on task- 
irrelevant stimuli and performed poorly although they could be motivated to 
improve performance. High anxiety individuals during low sta te  anxiety were 
able to concentrate on task-relevant stimuli and performed well. Specifically, 
performance could be hindered by concentration on task-irrelevant stimuli. 
Wine also noted that high anxious individuals were affected by threat of 
failure, ego-threat, rather than physical threat. When high anxiety state  is 
induced by threat of physical harm, a s  in threat of shock, individuals did not 
show impaired performance (Morris & Liebert, 1973).
Eysenck (1983) has commented that these  cognitive theories do not have 
compelling experimental evidence to support their hypotheses. Although 
they do predict the observed inverted-U response outcome, other hypotheses 
generated by the theory have not been supported. In particular, these 
theories do not account for evidence that som e anxiety can improve 
performance. A theory derived by Easterbrook (1959) does hypothesize the 
possible beneficial effects of anxiety upon performance. Easterbrook's 
theory proposes that anxiety produces a  restriction in the range of 
environmental cues which are cognitively processed. Increasing anxiety 
level to an optimal amount may restrict environmental cues to allow only 
necessary  processing and optimal use of attention. Lower levels of anxiety 
are associated with not enough restriction of environmental cues and too 
much irrelevant information is processed which impairs performance. Higher 
levels of anxiety are associated with a  restriction of too many cues, such that 
som e vital cues may not be processed, and impaired performance results.
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He predicted that an optimal, intermediate, level of anxiety would produce 
optimal performance; he predicted an inverted-U relationship between 
anxiety and performance.
A more recent theory concerning attention, anxiety, and performance was 
derived by Kahneman (1973). Kahneman proposes that anxiety is 
associated with task irrelevant stimuli, such as  worry, which takes attentional- 
processing capability away from the relevant task. He suggests that 
individuals respond to, or com pensate for, the decrease in task relevant 
processing with increased effort. During high anxiety states, performance is 
related to the amount of effort given to processing task-relevant information.
If the individual is unable to com pensate for the decreased processing 
capability, performance will suffer. Kahneman suggests that available 
attentional capacity varies according to the task being completed. This 
variable capacity is decreased by arousal and increased by effort. Evidence 
for a  variable available attentional capacity has come from research involving 
digit-span memory. Digit-span memory is believed to index working memory, 
or attentional capacity (Baddely & Hitch, 1974). Under high state anxiety 
conditions, digit span decreases (see Eysenck 1977; 1981 for review). This 
result is taken a s  evidence that attentional capacity decreases during high 
sta te  anxiety. It is also possible, however, that attentional capacity remains 
the sam e while attentional processing is directed at task-irrelevant stimuli 
such a s  internal and external cues relevant to the anxiety stimuli. Less 
attentional capability is directed at task-relevant stimuli but the capacity 
remains constant. Both theories predict poorer digit-span performance 
during high state  anxiety.
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Recently, other theories have been hypothesized to describe the 
relationship between anxiety and cognitive, motor, and/or athletic 
performance (Krane, 1992). Most researchers, however, recognize a 
correlational, inverted-U relationship between anxiety and performance 
(Neiss, 1988). Many interpretations are offered to explain why this 
relationship exists. Although none of the explanatory theories are universally 
accepted, the facilitation of research has increased understanding of the 
relationship between anxiety and performance. In particular, research has 
consistently indicated that individual characteristics, such a s  trait anxiety, 
interact with state anxiety to affect performance. The current investigation 
exam ines this interaction and its affect upon both cognitive and motor 
performance in a  repetition priming lexical decision task.
Rationale and Hypotheses
Rationale
Jackson & G eer's (1993b) research examining aversive emotional 
information in an LDT suggests that a  mechanism operates to inhibit, or 
interfere with, the facilitory priming effect of semantically related emotional 
prime and target words (e.g. KILL-DEAD). The hypothesized inhibition, or 
interference, spreads from the node representing the prime stimuli (e.g. KILL) 
to the node representing the target stimuli (e.g. DEAD). The current 
investigation proposed a  replication of this effect a s  well a s  a  more direct 
examination of the potential inhibitory mechanism. To replicate and extend 
the earlier research the original priming lexical decision task and a  repetition 
priming task are employed. By utilizing a  repetition priming task, facilitory 
priming can be examined without being confounded by the complexities of
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sem antic relationships between prime and target words. Using the identical 
word a s  both prime and target (e.g. DEAD-DEAD) allows direct examination 
of hypothesized inhibitory effects upon the originally activated prime node. 
The effects of individual differences in state and trait anxiety upon this 
inhibitory mechanism are also examined.
There are five specific purposes of this study. First, this study investigates 
the cognitive processing of aversive emotional information within a  priming 
lexical decision task (LDT) paradigm to replicate prior findings by Jackson 
and G eer (1993b). Second, this study extends these  prior findings by further 
investigating a  possible inhibitory mechanism by using a  repetition priming 
LDT paradigm. Third, this study investigates the relationship between 
individual differences of state and trait anxiety and patterns of responding to 
the priming task. Fourth, this study examines individual differences of state 
and trait anxiety in motor response times. B ecause we examine the cognitive 
processing of aversive emotional information, individual differences in motor 
response times are partialled out from the total reaction time to reveal a  more 
accurate cognitive decision time. Finally, this study exam ines differential 
responding of high and low anxious individuals to social and physical threat- 
related emotional targets.
To accomplish these  five purposes, the current investigation utilizes the 
priming lexical decision task  and a  number recognition task. The network 
system  is employed a s  a  framework to benefit the understanding of 
representations, storage, and retrieval of information. The LDT paradigm 
allows researchers to examine the responses to a  target word when the 
target is primed with the sam e word, a  semantically related word, a  different 
nonemotional word, or a  different emotional word.
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Of interest to the cognitive task of this study are situations in which the 
facilitory priming effect is expected to occur but does not. Inhibitory 
processes, a s  described earlier, are said to occur in these  situations. The 
facilitory priming, or the facilitation due to priming, refers to the decrease  in 
response time from when the target word is primed with an unrelated word to 
when the target word is primed with the sam e or a  semantically related word. 
This study com pares the facilitory priming for emotional stimuli to the facilitory 
priming for nonemotional priming.
If an inhibitory mechanism operates within a  network system  to inhibit 
responding to emotional stimuli, the facilitory priming effect for emotional 
stimuli should not be a s  great a s  the facilitory priming effect for nonemotional 
stimuli. In fact, this priming lexical decision task directly tests  the notion of 
inhibition observed by Jackson and G eer (1993b). In that research, inhibition 
w as observed for semantically related emotional stimuli. It is also suggested  
that the capability of the inhibition mechanism may vary a s  a  function of 
individual differences such a s  state and trait anxiety. Research indicates that 
individuals with high levels of sta te  and trait anxiety may selectively attend to 
negative emotional information (Williams et al., 1988). This hypervigilance 
may be associated with decreased  inhibitory p rocesses (Fox 1994; Jackson 
and Geer, 1993b).
Because sta te  and trait anxiety is being examined a s  individual 
differences, it is important to examine the effects of state and trait anxiety 
upon motor functioning. Cognitive tasks usually require motor responses a s  
indicators of cognitive ability. Anxiety has been reported to affect motor 
performance and may confound results from cognitive tasks (Jackson & Geer, 
1993a). Although it w as hoped that random assignm ent of subjects and the
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notion of chance would prevent motor responding from confounding results 
from this cognitive task, the current study examined this issue and used motor 
responding a s  a  covariate in analyses.
The interaction between threat type (social and physical) and anxiety 
level is also examined. Fox (1993b; 1994) has suggested that social threat 
would be of greater emotional concern than physical threat for individuals 
scoring high on the STAI. This study examines general responses to threat 
type and investigates possible differences in responding associated with 
varying levels of anxiety.
The design of the study involved a  2 x 4 within subjects variation of target 
word emotionality (emotional, nonemotional), and the relationship between 
the prime and target words (emotional prime unrelated to target [e.g. 
STUPID-BEATEN], nonemotional prime unrelated to target [e.g. CRADLE- 
BEATEN], prime related to target [e.g. ABUSED-BEATEN], and prime 
identical to target [e.g. BEATEN-BEATEN]). All analyses involved response 
times a s  the dependent variable. Subjects were placed into high or low state 
and trait anxiety groups according to scores on the Spielberger State-Trait 
Inventory (STAI). Although it would have been most preferable to have 
examined the interaction of these  groups and responding i n a 2 x 2 x 2 x 4  
(state anxiety X trait anxiety X target emotionality X relationship between the 
words) mixed model, the low number of subjects comprising the high state 
anxiety/low trait anxiety and low state anxiety/high trait anxiety groups was 
too low to warrant this analysis. Instead, data w as examined in separate  2 x 
2 x 4  (anxiety level X target emotionality X relationship between the words) 
analyses. This form of analysis also allows for investigation of the 
conceptually different constructs of state and trait anxiety. Although these
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constructs are believed to be highly correlated, they are believed to m easure 
unique concepts of transient and long-standing characteristics. Results from 
the motor task serve as  covariates for analyses of results from the cognitive 
task. In addition to examination of these overall responding effects, the 
following hypotheses were examined.
H ypotheses
Hypothesis 1.
It is hypothesized that target words primed with the sam e word (e.g. 
jacket-JACKET) will yield faster response times than target words primed with 
an unrelated word (e.g. signal-JACKET). This hypothesis results from 
research documenting a  facilitory effect for repetition priming (see  Jordan, 
1986 for a  review).
Hypothesis 2.
It is hypothesized that target words primed with a  related word (e.g. 
blazer-JACKET) will yield faster response times than target words primed 
with an unrelated word (e.g. signal-JACKET). This hypothesis results from 
research documenting a  facilitory effect for semantic/related priming (see 
Neely, 1990 for a  review).
Hypothesis 3.
It is hypothesized that emotional targets primed with different, unrelated 
emotional words (e.g. prison-CANCER) will yield faster response times than 
emotional targets primed with different, unrelated nonemotional words (e.g. 
mirror-CANCER). This hypothesis is based upon the emotional priming effect
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found by both Hill and Kemp-Wheeler (1989b; Kemp-Wheeler & Hill, 1991) 
and Jackson and G eer (1993b).
Hypothesis 4.
It is hypothesized that the amount of facilitation between nonemotional 
target words primed with the sam e word (e.g. eagle-EAGLE) and target 
words primed with different, unrelated nonemotional words (e.g. onion- 
EAGLE) will be greater than the amount of facilitation between emotional 
target words primed with the sam e word (e.g. fatal-FATAL) and target words 
primed with unrelated emotional words (e.g. cruel-FATAL).
This comparison includes emotional targets primed with unrelated 
emotional words (e.g. cruel-FATAL) rather than nonemotional words (e.g. 
onion-FATAL) due to hypothesized emotional priming effects dem onstrated 
by Hill and Kemp-Wheeler (1989b) and Jackson and G eer (1993b). These 
hypothesized emotional priming effects may exaggerate repetition priming 
effects. The current hypothesis is intended to focus upon repetition priming 
effects without the effects of emotional priming. Hypothesis four is derived 
from previous research indicating an inhibitory effect on lexical decision 
times for emotional target words primed with related emotional words 
(Jackson & Geer, 1993b).
Hypothesis 5.
It is hypothesized that the amount of facilitation between nonemotional 
target words primed with related words (e.g. talon-EAGLE) and target words 
primed with different, unrelated nonemotional words (e.g. onion-EAGLE) will 
be greater than the amount of facilitation between emotional target words
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primed with related words (e.g. toxic-FATAL) and target words primed with 
unrelated emotional words (e.g. cruel-FATAL). This hypothesis is also 
derived from previous research indicating an inhibitory effect lexical decision 
tim es for emotional target words primed with related emotional words 
(Jackson & Geer, 1993b).
Hypothesis 6.
It is hypothesized that individual differences in state and trait anxiety will 
account for a  significant am ount of the variance in cognitive responding to 
both emotional and nonemotional target words. Individual differences in 
sta te  and trait anxiety were not found to account for a  significant amount of 
variance in Jackson & G eer's (1993b) study. This lack of significance 
opposes a  variety of research which suggests that individuals with high in 
sta te  and trait anxiety exhibit increased attention toward aversive emotional 
stimuli (MacLeod & Mathews, 1991; Mathews & MacLeod, 1985; Mogg, 
Mathews, Eysenck, & May, 1991; Mogg, Mathews, & Weinman, 1989). It is 
hypothesized that individuals high in state and trait anxiety will exhibit a  
decreased  inhibition of emotional stimuli in comparison to individuals low in 
sta te  and trait anxiety. A lack of inhibition for high anxiety individuals may 
result in increased attention toward aversive emotional stimuli.
Hypothesis 7.
It is hypothesized that motor response times will vary as  a  function of state 
and trait anxiety individual differences. This hypothesis is derived from 
previous research of Jackson and G eer (1993a) indicating that motor 
responding in a number recognition task varied as  a  function of state and trait
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anxiety. By partialling out motor response times, more accurate cognitive 
response times may be examined.
Hypothesis 8.
It w as hypothesized that low anxiety subjects would respond slower to 
social threat than physical threat stimuli. It w as also hypothesized that high 
anxiety subjects would respond faster to social threat than physical threat 
stimuli. T hese hypotheses were derived from theories concerning the 
inhibition of threat-related stimuli for low anxious individuals and the 
attentional bias toward threat-related stimuli for high anxious individuals. 
Previous research suggests that individuals differentially respond to threat- 
related stimuli which is personally relevant or concerning (Eysenck, Mogg, 
May, Richards, & Mathews, 1991; Mathews & Klug, 1993). B ecause it has 
been suggested  that the STAI, the current index of anxiety, m easures 
concerns of social threat, it is hypothesized that any facilitation or inhibition 




Ninety-four undergraduate students served a s  subjects in this study. 
Subjects were recruited from undergraduate psychology courses and 
received extra credit for their participation. All subjects were fully informed of 
the requirements of participation in the study and their involvement w as 
strictly on a  volunteer basis. Subjects were randomly assigned to one of the 
four versions of the experiment. For analysis of state and trait anxiety 
interactions, subjects were placed into high and low anxiety groups. Thirty- 
one subjects scored below 32 on the state anxiety scale of the STAI and 
w ere classified in the low state anxiety group. Twenty-eight subjects scored 
above 39 on the sta te  anxiety scale and were classified in the high state 
anxiety group. Thirty-three subjects scored below 32 on the trait anxiety 
scale to form the low trait anxiety group while 26 subject scored above 39 to 
form the high trait anxiety group. These scores represent a  cut-off of above 
53-54 t-score for high anxiety and below 46 t-score for low anxiety. State and 
trait anxiety scores were significantly correlated (r = .66, g  <.0001) 
Demographic information is presented in Table 1.
Materials
The lexical decision and number recognition tasks were presented on 
a  computer screen utilizing the Micro Experimental Lab (MEL) program. The 
lexical decision priming task consisted of 384 prime-target pairs. Of these  













N 94 31 28 33 26








38.27 27.68 49.08 32.03 47.38
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nonemotional target word, and the remaining 192 pairs had a  nonword 
target. The set of 96 pairs with an emotional target consisted of 24 emotional 
target words primed by (a) the sam e word, (b) a  related emotional word,
(c) an unrelated emotional word, or (d) an unrelated nonemotional word. The 
se t of 96 pairs with a  nonemotional target consisted of 24 nonemotional 
target words primed by (a) the sam e word, (b) a  related nonemotional word, 
(c) an unrelated nonemotional word, or (d) an unrelated emotional word. The 
se t of 192 pairs with a  nonword target consisted of 64 nonword targets 
primed by (a) the sam e nonword, (b) an emotional word, or (c) a 
nonemotional word.
Four different forms, or versions, of this task were used so that subjects 
responded to each target word only once. Each version consisted of 96 
trials: 24 with emotional targets, 24 with nonemotional targets, and 48 with 
nonword targets. This methodology w as chosen to (a) eliminate possible 
practice effects occurring from responding to the sam e target word more than 
once and (b) utilize the sam e target words for comparison of repetition 
priming and emotional priming. Versions of the task were randomly assigned 
and data from each version w as combined for analysis. Target words and 
target nonwords were presented in upper case  letters while primes were 
presented in lower case  letters to reduce the effects of episodic memory a s  
described by Neely (1990).
The number recognition task  served a s  the motor movement task  for the 
current investigation. This task was also presented on a  computer screen 
utilizing the MEL program. The MEL program recorded both reaction time 
and accuracy data for each subject. Inaccurate responses are not included 
in analyses. The task was comprised of 80 trials; 40 trials presenting the
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number 1 a s  a  target, 40 trials presenting the number 2 a s  a  target. Subjects 
responded to the 80 trials by pressing corresponding keys (1 or 2) on a 
computer keyboard. The keys pressed were identical to those pressed 
during the repetition priming trials. The Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety 
Inventory (STAI; Spielberger et al., 1970) was used to a s se s s  state and trait 
anxiety.
Procedure for Obtaining Words
A list of 360 words was constructed from lists used in previous studies 
investigating cognition and emotion (Gotlib & Cane, 1987; Gotlib, 
MacLachlan, & Katz, 1988; Jackson & Geer, 1993b; John, 1988). Words 
were chosen for this list based on their previous use a s  either aversive 
emotional or nonemotional stimuli. This list was divided into smaller lists 
which were presented to pilot subjects in a  paper and pencil format. Each 
word w as rated by at least 50 subjects and som e words were rated by a s  
many a s  150 subjects. Pilot subjects were asked to rate each word for 
negative, positive, or neutral emotional value. The scale used w as a s  
follows:
-3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3
extremely negative neutral extremely positive
Subjects were informed that the list contained a variety of emotional and 
nonemotional words. Subjects were asked to disregard personal preference 
for other word characteristics (e.g. how pleasant the word sounds). Mean
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ratings for aversive emotional and nonemotional target words used in this 
study are presented in Appendix A.
A separate  set of pilot subjects were asked to rate the sam e 360 words for 
familiarity. Although frequency ratings are often used in cognition and 
emotion research, familiarity ratings, how familiar the word is to subjects, 
yield higher correlations with response times in lexical access  research 
(Connine, Mullenix, Shernoff, & Yelen, 1990). Pilot subjects were asked to 
recall how often they see  or hear each word. Each word w as rated by 200 
subjects. The scale used w as a s  follows:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
not familiar at all familiar extremely familiar
Sets of target words were equated for word familiarity, word length, and 
number of syllables. Sets of prime words used with target words were also 
equated for word familiarity, word length, and number of syllables. These 
se ts  are presented in Appendix B.
A separate set of pilot subjects were asked to rate the association 
between 148 se ts  of words. These ratings were then equated for each 
condition of emotional and nonemotional targets and the highest associated 
pairs were accepted into the study. The selected pairs of words, along with 
their rated level of association are presented in Appendix C. The scale used 
w as a s  follows:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
not associated at all associated extremely associated
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Procedure
After being given a  brief description of the experiment subjects were 
asked  to sign the informed consent form. Subjects were then asked to 
com plete the STAI (Appendix D for exemplars). Subjects were then seated  
in front of a  computer terminal and asked to read the instructions for the 
experim ent which w as displayed on the computer screen. Subjects were 
given 10 practice number recognition trials and 30 practice word recognition 
trails to acquaint them with the tasks. Breaks were initiated by the computer 
program between se ts  of word and number trials. Subjects were allowed to 
term inate the breaks by pressing a  space bar to continue the experiment. 
Practice trials w ere followed by instructions informing the subject that 
experimental trials would com m ence. Subjects were given 40 num ber 
recognition trials, a  break, 48 word recognition trials, a  break, 40 number 
recognition trials, a  break, and 48 separate  word recognition trials.
In the word recognition task, each trial began with a  100 m s presentation 
of an attention-capturing plus sign. A prime word, presented in lower-case 
letters, then replaced the plus sign and remained on the screen for 300 ms.
A blank screen appeared for 100 ms followed by the presentation of the 
target letter string, presented in upper-case letters. The subject then decided 
if the letter string w as or was not a  word in the English language and 
responded by pressing keys on the computer keyboard. The subject w as 
instructed to press "1" if the letter string w as a  word and a  "2" if the letter string 
w as not a  word. O nce the subject responded, the screen becam e blank for 
500 ms. This process was repeated for every word recognition trial.
In the num ber recognition task, each trial began with a  100 ms 
presentation of an attention-capturing plus sign. A row of 5 X's replaced the
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plus sign and remained on the screen for 300 ms. A blank screen appeared 
for 100 m s followed by the presentation of the target number. The subject 
then decided if the target number w as a  1 or 2 and responded by pressing 
keys on the computer keyboard. The subject w as instructed to press "1" if the 
number w as a  1 and a  "2" if the number w as a  2. O nce the subject 
responded, the screen becam e blank for 500 ms. This process w as repeated 
for every number recognition trial. The experiment took approximately 30 
minutes for each subject to complete.
RESULTS
Lexical decision times for nonword targets were not investigated. 
Inaccurate responses also were not included in the analyses. The overall 
group of subjects yielded 94.50 % accurate responses. The low state anxiety 
group resulted in 94.02 % accuracy while the high state  anxiety group 
resulted in 93.83 % accuracy. The low trait anxiety group resulted in 93.92 % 
accuracy while the high trait anxiety group resulted in 94.83 % accuracy.
Data for individual subjects w as averaged for each experimental condition.
Data were examined using general linear model (GLM) analyses. A 2 
(target type) x 4 (relationship between prime and target) repeated m easures 
ANOVA w as used to analyze the data. This analysis revealed a  main effect 
for target type [F (1,93) = 10.04 g  <.002] indicating that faster reaction times 
were associated with nonemotional targets (M = 640.64 ms) than emotional 
targets (M = 657.28 ms). A main effect for the relationship between the 
prime and target, referred to a s  "relationship", [F (3, 91) = 20.48 g  <.0001] 
w as also found. Subjects responded with faster reaction times to repeated 
words pairs (M. = 598.06) than related word pairs (M. = 648.50) [t = 5.18, g  < 
.0001] which were responded to faster than unrelated word pairs (M =
676.03) [t = 3.27, g  < .001]. Table 2 presents m ean reaction times for each 
condition of this 2 x 4  analysis. Mean reaction times are represented 
graphically in Figure 1. The original hypotheses were investigated using 
simple effects tests. No interactions were found to be significant.
Hypothesis one postulated that target words primed with the sam e word 
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Emotional Unrelated Emotional Prime 678.25
(118.75)




Emotional Repeated Prime 612.71(178.34)
Emotional Related Prime 661.61(123.70)
Nonemotional Unrelated Emotional Prime 668.27(120.48)
Nonemotional Unrelated Nonemotional Prime
675.50
(123.69)
Nonemotional Repeated Prime 583.41(103.80)
























■ 1  Emotional Target V  Unrelated Emotional Prime
_ □  Unrelated Nonemotional Prime
I I Nonemotional Target A _  ,A  Related Prime
O Repeated Prime
Note. Means with similar subscripts are not significantly different 
at p < .05.
Figure 1. Interaction between target type and relation between words
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primed with an unrelated word (unrelated condition). Data analysis indicated 
that this prediction w as supported. Mean response times for repeated primes 
and targets (M = 598.06 ms) were significantly faster than unrelated primes 
and targets (M. = 676.03 ms) [t = 7.84, £  < .0001]. This finding replicates the 
facilitory effect for repetition priming.
Hypothesis two postulated that target words primed with a related word 
(related condition) would yield faster response times than target words 
primed with an unrelated word (unrelated condition). Data analysis found 
that m ean response time for related primes and targets (JM = 648.50 ms) were 
significantly faster than unrelated primes and targets (jM = 676.03 ms) [t = 
3.27, £  < .001]. This finding replicates the facilitory effect for semantically 
related word priming.
Hypothesis three predicted that emotional targets primed with unrelated 
emotional words would yield faster response times than emotional targets 
primed with unrelated nonemotional words. Analyses found that m ean 
response tim es for emotional targets primed with unrelated emotional words 
(M = 678.25 ms) were not significantly faster than emotional targets primed 
with unrelated nonemotional words (M = 676.57 ms) [e < .87]. This effect w as 
not statistically significant. The current data failed to replicate the emotional 
priming effect found by Hill and Kemp-Wheeler (1989b; Kemp-Wheeler & Hill, 
1991) and Jackson and G eer (1993b).
Hypothesis four suggested that the amount of facilitation between 
nonemotional target words primed with the sam e word (repeated 
nonemotional condition) and target words primed with unrelated 
nonemotional words (unrelated condition) would be greater than the 
facilitation between the emotional targets in the repeated condition and the
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unrelated condition. Although mean response times w ere in the predicted 
direction, they did not yield a  significant difference (p < .16). Mean facilitation 
in response time between nonemotional repeated and unrelated conditions 
(M = 92.09 ms) w as not significantly greater than facilitation in response time 
between emotional repeated and unrelated conditions (M = 65.54 ms).
T hese findings do not support the "inhibition of facilitation" found by Jackson 
and G eer (1993b).
Hypothesis five predicted that the amount of facilitation between 
nonemotional target words primed by unrelated nonemotional words 
(unrelated condition) and nonemotional target words primed by related 
nonemotional words (related condition) would be greater than the facilitation 
between emotional targets in the unrelated condition and the related 
condition. Again, mean response times were in the predicted direction but 
did not yield a  significant difference (p < .14). Mean facilitation in response 
time between nonemotional related and unrelated conditions (JM = 40.10 ms) 
w as not significantly greater than facilitation in response time between 
emotional related and unrelated conditions (M = 16.64 ms). This finding 
failed to replicate the "inhibition of facilitation" found by Jackson and G eer 
(1993b).
Hypothesis six predicted that individual differences in sta te  and trait 
anxiety would account for a  significant amount of variance in lexical decision 
tim es to emotional and nonemotional target words. To examine this 
prediction, individuals were placed into high or low sta te  anxiety groups a s  
well a s  high or low trait anxiety groups. Groups were formed independently 
for sta te  and trait anxiety. Individuals scoring below 32 on either the state  or 
trait subscale of the STAI were classified a s  "low" anxiety for that subscale.
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Individuals scoring above 39 on either subscale were classified a s  "high" 
anxiety for that subscale. Demographic information regarding these  groups 
is located in Table 1. This data were then examined using GLM analyses. 
Separate 2 (anxiety level) x 2 (target type) x 4 (relationship between prime 
and target) repeated m easures ANOVAs were used to analyze the effects of 
sta te  and trait anxiety on lexical decision times.
Analysis Involving State Anxiety
In the 2 (state anxiety level) x 2 (target type) x 4 (relationship between 
prime and target) repeated m easures ANOVA involving state anxiety two 
main effects and a  significant three-way interaction were revealed. No two- 
way interactions were found to be significant. The first main effect was for 
target type [F (1,57) = 4.02 £  < .04]. This effect indicated that reaction times 
w ere faster for nonemotional targets (JM = 640.69 ms) than emotional targets 
(M = 656.36 ms). This finding replicates the general results of Jackson and 
G eer (1993b). The second main effect was for relationship [E (3, 55) = 15.18 
g  <.0001]. This effect indicated that subjects responded with faster reaction 
times to words that were repeated (M = 596.99 ms) than words that were 
related (M. = 648.36 ms) [t = 4.28, £  < .0001]. Subjects also responded with 
faster reaction times to related word pairs (M = 648.36 ms) than unrelated 
word pairs (JM = 675.58 ms) [t = 2.28, £  < .02]. This finding replicates the well- 
docum ented semantic and repetition priming facilitory effects described by 
Neely (1990).
Results from the above mian effects were dependent upon a  significant 
three-way interaction between state anxiety, target type, and relationship 
between prime and target [E (3, 55) = 3.56 £  <.01 ] for their accurate
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interpretation. Table 3 presents m ean reaction times for each level of state 
anxiety. This three-way interaction is graphed in Figure 2. In general, this 
interaction indicates that lexical decision times were faster for related word 
pairs than unrelated word pairs. Also in general, lexical decision times were 
faster for repeated word pairs than related word pairs. Each anxiety level 
had one exception to these  findings. For the low state anxiety group 
responses to emotional targets in the repeated condition were not a s  fast as  
responses to nonemotional targets in the repeated condition. For the high 
s ta te  anxiety group responses to emotional targets in the related condition 
were not a s  fast a s  responses to nonemotional targets in the related 
condition. Simple effects tests  were performed to further investigate the 
original hypotheses. These results will be outlined briefly. The facilitory 
effect for repetition priming w as found for both low state [t = 4.68, p  < .0001 ] 
and high state anxiety [t = 4.50, p  < .0001]. The facilitory effect for related 
priming was found for low state anxiety [t = 2.33, p  < .02] but was not found for 
high state anxiety. The emotional priming effect w as not evidenced in either 
low or high state  anxiety groups.
Both low and high state anxiety groups dem onstrated a  distinct lack of 
facilitation for emotional word pairs when facilitation w as expected. This lack 
of facilitation, however, was found in different priming conditions for each 
anxiety level. The low state anxiety group exhibited significantly less of a  
repetition priming facilitory effect for emotional targets (M = 35.65 ms) than 
nonemotional targets (M = 100.42 ms) [t = 2.08, p  < .04]. The high state 
anxiety group exhibited significantly less of a  related priming facilitory effect 
for emotional targets (M. = 11.65 ms) than nonemotional targets (M = 64.76 
ms) [t = 2.47, p  < .02].
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Table 3
Mean Reaction Time (milliseconds) for the Interaction between 
State Anxiety. Target Type, and Relation between Words
Target Type Relation between Words







Emotional Unrelated Emotional Prime 686.10(113.80)
680.76
(124.02)










Emotional Related Prime 658.05(120.02)
669.11
(136.87)
Nonemotional Unrelated Emotional Prime 689.76(127.62)
657.64
(103.73)





Nonemotional Repeated Prime 581.97(103.98)
587.96
(112.02)
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V  Unrelated Emotional Prime
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Note. Means with similar subscripts are not significantly different 
at p < .05.
Figure 2. Interaction between state anxiety, target type, and 
relation between words
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Analysis Involving Trait Anxiety
In the 2 (trait anxiety level) x 2 (target type) x 4 (relationship between 
prime and target) repeated m easures ANOVA involving trait anxiety two main 
effects and a  three-way interaction were revealed. No two-way interactions 
were found to be significant. The first main effect w as for target type [F (1,67) 
= 6.92 p  <.01 ] . This effect indicated that reaction times were faster for 
nonemotional targets (M = 639.22 ms) than emotional targets (M = 656.84 
ms). This finding replicates the general results of Jackson and G eer 
(1993b). The second main effect w as for relationship [F (3, 65) = 10.04 p  
< .0001]. This effect indicated that subjects responded with faster reaction 
tim es to words that were repeated (M = 596.58 ms) than words that were 
related (M = 647.76 ms) [t = 3.33, p  < .001]. Subjects also responded with 
faster reaction times to related word pairs (M = 647.76 ms) than unrelated 
word pairs (M = 675.31 ms) [t = 2.74, p  < .007]. This finding replicates the 
well-documented sem antic and repetition priming facilitory effects described 
by Neely (1990).
Results from the above mian effects were dependent upon a significant 
three-way interaction between trait anxiety, target type, and relationship 
between prime and target [F (3, 65) = 2.62 p  <.Q5] for their accurate 
interpretation. Table 4 presents mean reaction times for each level of trait 
anxiety. This three-way interaction is graphed in Figure 3. This interaction 
indicates that lexical decision times were faster for related word pairs than 
unrelated word pairs. Lexical decision times were also faster for repeated 
word pairs than related words pairs. Similar to the findings for low and high 
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Note. M eans with similar subscripts are not significantly different 
at p < .05.
Figure 3. Interaction between trait anxiety, target type, and 
relation between words
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The low trait anxiety group exhibited significantly less of a  repetition priming 
facilitory effect for emotional targets (M = 6.46 ms) than nonemotional targets 
(M = 86.28 ms) [t = 2.08, £  < .04]. The high trait anxiety group exhibited 
significantly less of a  related priming facilitory effect for emotional targets (M 
= 5.7 ms) than nonemotional targets (M = 54.74 ms) [t = 2.47, £  < .02]. These 
findings are parallel to the findings for state anxiety. Low anxious subjects 
exhibited a  lack of facilitation of repetition priming for emotional targets. High 
anxious subjects exhibited a  lack of semantic priming for emotional targets 
responded to emotional targets in the repeated condition were not a s  fast a s  
expected for low anxiety subjects. Additional simple effects tests  were 
performed to investigate the original hypotheses and will be outlined briefly.
The repetition priming facilitory effect w as found for both low trait anxiety [t 
= 2.26, p  < .03] and high trait anxiety [t = 6.46, £  < .0001]. The facilitory effect 
for related priming was found for low trait anxiety [t = 2.15, £ <  .03] but was 
not found for high trait anxiety. The emotional priming effect w as not 
evidenced for either low or high trait anxiety groups. The low trait anxiety 
group exhibited less of a  repetition priming facilitory effect for emotional 
targets than nonemotional targets although this trend was not statistically 
significant (£ <.10). The high trait anxiety group exhibited significantly less of 
a  related priming facilitory effect for emotional targets than nonemotional 
targets [t = 2.07, £  < .04],
Hypothesis seven predicted that motor response times would vary a s  a 
function of anxiety level. This was found for trait anxiety [E (1,67) = 3.67 £  
<.05]. This finding prompted the need to partial out motor response times to 
more accurately examine the interaction between anxiety and lexical 
decision times. To accomplish this examination, separate 2 (anxiety level) x
62
2 (target type) x 4 (relationship between prime and target) repeated 
m easures ANCOVAs were used to analyze the data. To ensure that the 
assumption of the homogeneity of slopes w as not violated, the interactions 
between the covariate and independent variables were investigated. T hese 
interactions were not significant for either sta te  or trait anxiety subject groups 
(p = .39, p = .18, respectively). Because this assumption w as not violated, 
ANCOVA analysis was conducted.
Analysis Involving State Anxiety with Covariate 
Re-examination of the 2 x 2 x 4 analysis involving state anxiety and using 
motor responding as  a  covariate continued to reveal a significant three-way 
interaction between state anxiety, target type, and relationship [F (3, 54) = 
3.38 £  <.02]. This interaction suggests that state anxiety accounted for 
significant variance in lexical decision reaction times above and beyond the 
variance accounted for by motor responding.
Analysis Involving Trait Anxiety with Covariate 
Re-examination of the 2 x 2 x 4 analysis involving trait anxiety and using 
motor responding a s  a  covariate failed to reveal any main effects or 
interactions between trait anxiety, target type, and relationship. When motor 
response times were used a s  a  covariate, all previously resulting significant 
main and interaction effects were no longer significant. This lack of findings 
suggests  that motor responding accounted for greater variance in lexical 
decision reaction times than trait anxiety.
Results indicated that high and low state  anxiety are associated with 
different patterns of responding to emotional and nonemotional target words,
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dependent upon the relationship between the prime and target words. In 
particular, low state anxious individuals exhibited a  lack of facilitation for 
repeated emotional targets in comparison to nonemotional targets. They did 
not dem onstrate any difference between responses to related emotional and 
nonemotional targets. High state anxious individuals exhibited a  lack of 
facilitation for related emotional targets in comparison to nonemotional 
targets. This group did not dem onstrate any difference between responses to 
repeated emotional and nonemotional targets. W hereas low state  anxious 
individuals dem onstrated a  lack of facilitation for emotional words in the 
repeated condition, the high state  anxious individuals dem onstrated a  lack of 
facilitation for emotional words in the related condition.
Analysis Involving Social and Physical Threat 
Data from eighty of the original 94 subjects w as examined to investigate 
threat type of emotional targets and lexical decision times. Emotional targets 
were classified by the author a s  representing either social or physical threat. 
Due to limited num bers of experimental trials, this analysis only included 
responses to targets that were primed by words with the sam e threat type.
This analysis also excluded targets words primed by the sam e word, in the 
repeated condition. Hypothesis eight suggested that individuals with 
differing anxiety levels would exhibit differential responding to social and 
physical threat stimuli. In particular, it was predicted that low anxious 
subjects would respond slower to social threat than physical threat stimuli. It 
w as also hypothesized that high anxiety subjects would respond faster to 
social threat than physical threat stimuli. A 2 (anxiety level) x 3 (threat type) 
repeated m easures ANOVA w as used to analyze the data. Analysis revealed
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a main effect for threat type [F (2,78) = 4.26 q <.01 ] without an interaction with 
state or trait anxiety. The main effect indicated that social threat target words 
(M = 704.48 ms) were responded to significantly slower than physical threat 
target words (M = 644.28 ms) [t = 2.78, £  < .006] which did not differ from 
nonemotional target words (M = 642.81 ms). Table 5 presents m ean reaction 
times for each level of state and trait anxiety.
Table 5
Mean Reaction Time (milliseconds) for Social Threat. Physical 












































The current study addressed five concerns. First, this study served to 
replicate the findings of Jackson and G eer (1993b) by demonstrating less 
sem antic facilitory priming for emotional target words in 
comparison to nonemotional target words. This effect w as found for high 
anxious individuals. Second, this study served to extend these  findings by 
investigating repetition facilitory priming for emotional and nonemotional 
target words. The current study's findings dem onstrated less repetition 
facilitory priming for emotional target words in comparison to nonemotional 
target words. This effect w as found for low anxious individuals. Third, this 
study examined the interaction between these  facilitory effects and state and 
trait anxiety. In general, state and trait anxiety scores were associated with 
similar patterns of responding. High state and trait anxious individuals 
exhibited less semantic priming for emotional rather than nonemotional 
words. Low state and trait anxious individuals exhibited less repetition 
priming for emotional rather than nonemotional words. Fourth, this study 
examined the interaction between anxiety level and motor response times. 
Motor response times were found to vary a s  a  function of trait anxiety. Once 
motor response times are covaried from the analysis, all interactions between 
trait anxiety and lexical decisions were no longer significant. The interactions 
between state anxiety and lexical decisions maintained significance. Finally, 
this study com pared responses to social and physical threat-related target 
words. Regardless of anxiety level, individuals responded slower to social
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threat-related target words than physical threat-related target words, which 
did not differ from responses to nonemotional target words.
Perhaps one of the most interesting results of the current study is the 
different pattern of responding exhibited by high and low anxious individuals 
and the implications of this finding on the hypothesized mechanism that 
inhibits, or interferes with, the processing of emotional information. In the 
current study, the lack of semantic facilitory priming for emotional word pairs 
found in Jackson and G eer (1993b) was not found for the overall group of 
subjects. In addition, a  lack of repetition facilitory priming for emotional word 
pairs that w as hypothesized to result from an inhibitory mechanism was also 
not found for the overall group of subjects.
The hypothesized interactions did appear, however, when comparing 
high and low anxiety groups. In fact, members of high and low anxiety 
groups had different patterns of these  interactions. Individuals with low state 
anxiety exhibited less of a  facilitory effect for repeated emotional word pairs 
than nonemotional word pairs. The repeated emotional word pair 
condition did not yield the facilitation in lexical decision times that w as 
expected. The low anxiety group did not exhibit any differences between the 
facilitatory effect for related emotional word pairs and nonemotional related 
word pairs.
In contrast to these  findings, individuals with either high state or trait 
anxiety scores exhibited less of a  facilitory effect for related emotional word 
pairs than nonemotional word pairs. The related emotional word pair 
condition did not yield the facilitation in lexical decision times that was 
expected. The high anxiety group did not exhibit any differences between
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the facilitatory effect for repeated emotional word pairs and nonemotional 
repeated word pairs.
The lack of facilitory effects for either related or repeated emotional word 
pair conditions is described a s  indicating the existence of a  mechanism that 
inhibits, or interferes with, the processing of emotional information. This 
mechanism will be discussed later. It is interesting that the lack of facilitory 
effects w as evidenced for both high and low anxiety groups, but not for the 
entire subject group overall. It is suggested that similar to the interaction 
betw een anxiety level and motor responding, the relationship between 
anxiety level and these  facilitory effects, or lack thereof, may not be linear. 
Unless the overall group is predominantly high or low anxious, analysis of 
the overall group may conceal any differences in responding due to anxiety 
level.
The original data from Jackson and G eer (1993b) included subjects with 
varying levels of anxiety, but the majority were low anxious individuals. The 
overall group of individuals revealed a  lack of facilitory effect for related 
emotional word pairs which w as taken a s  evidence of an inhibitory 
mechanism. This effect w as not found for the current low anxiety group. One 
possible explanation for this discrepancy involves the differing m ethods of 
obtaining associated, or related, word pairs. In Jackson and G eer (1993b) 
pilot subjects were asked to free associate to target words. From th ese  free 
associates, the prime words were selected for the study. Using this 
methodology, the resulting associated word pairs may have had more 
personal relevance for this population of subjects. Personal relevance has 
been recognized a s  an important factor in cognitive processing of emotional 
information (Eysenck et al., 1991; Mathews & Klug, 1993). In comparison, the
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current study requested that pilot subjects rate the association between a 
given se t of word pairs. Although the word pairs chosen for the study yielded 
high association ratings, th ese  pairs may not have personal relevance for the 
subjects.
This explanation, however, does not address the lack of facilitory effect for 
related emotional word pairs in the high anxiety condition. It is suggested  
that the related emotional word pairs may have had personal relevance for 
high anxious subjects. It has been hypothesized that individuals with high 
anxiety have more elaborate associative networks for threatening information 
(Williams et al., 1988). This suggests that not only are the links between 
threatening m eanings stronger but also greater in number. More information 
may be "linked" into the associative networks of threatening information for 
high anxious individuals. Given this hypothesis, it is possible that the links 
betw een the chosen associated word pairs were "stronger" or more 
personally relevant for the high anxiety group.
The discrepancy of results found for repeated emotional word pairs also 
p resents an interesting outcome of this study. The repeated condition w as 
designed to investigate a possible inhibitory mechanism in a  m anner less 
confounded by the restraints of word association. Indeed, the association, or 
sem antic relationship, between the identical prime and target is 
unambiguous and maximal. In addition, an inhibitory, or interfering, 
mechanism must outweigh the effects of enhanced lexical access  and 
episodic memory. This condition w as considered a  more stringent test of a  
possible inhibitory mechanism. Theories such a s  Bower's (1981) suggest 
that emotional words in repetition priming should result in lexical decision 
time facilitation. The resulting lack of facilitation in the repetition priming
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condition for emotional target words, in comparison to nonemotional target 
words, supports the existence of an inhibitory, or interfering, mechanism 
effecting the processing of emotional, threat-related information for the low 
sta te  anxiety group.
The current investigation w as also designed to examine the relationship 
between anxiety level and motor responding. Motor responding w as found to 
vary a s  a  function of trait anxiety and indicated the utility of using motor 
responding a s  a  covariate in following analyses. O nce motor response times 
w ere partialled from the data, interactions with trait anxiety w ere no longer 
significant. Motor responding accounted for greater variance in lexical 
decision times than w as accounted for by high or low trait anxiety.
Regardless of partialling out motor response times, the interaction involving 
sta te  anxiety maintained significance. This finding suggests that sta te  anxiety 
accounts for significant variance in lexical decision times above and beyond 
the variance accounted for by motor responding. This finding also suggests 
the previous interpretations for interactions between state  anxiety, target 
emotionality, and the relationship between the prime and target are not 
obscured by individual differences in motor responding. Interactions 
involving trait anxiety, however, were invalidated once motor responding w as 
taken into account.
The relationship between motor responding and anxiety level is of 
extrem e importance to future research involving cognitive tasks that require 
motor responding. This relationship is especially critical for research 
investigating the cognitive processing of aversive emotional, or threat- 
related, information. In most tasks, motor responding is assum ed to be a  
random variable. T hese results indicate that this assumption is not correct.
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Motor responding is not a  random variable and appears to interact greatest 
with trait anxiety level. This finding replicates the findings of Jackson and 
G eer (1993a) where anxiety level accounted for significant variance in motor 
responding, also indicating that motor responding is not a  random variable. 
Future research efforts involving cognitive tasks that require motor 
responding should consider partialling motor responses from the data to 
accurately examine the interaction between anxiety and cognitive task 
performance.
This study w as also designed to investigate lexical decision times for 
social and physical threat-related target words and their interaction with high 
and low anxiety levels. Overall, social threat targets were responded to 
slower than physical threat targets which did not differ from responses to 
nonemotional targets. This effect did not interact with sta te  or trait anxiety 
groups. The general slowing of social threat-related words can also be 
viewed a s  evidence supporting an inhibitory, or interfering, m echanism  that 
operates on aversive emotional, or threat-related, information. As suggested 
earlier, the STAI is based on social-evaluative issues (Fox 1993b; 1994).
Any attentional bias or inhibitory process may be most evident for social 
threat rather than physical threat targets. B ecause the current study did not 
manipulate the relationship of social and physical threat targets with social 
and physical threat primes, the true nature of facilitation or inhibition of 
responding to threat-types is unclear. Future research efforts may be 
directed to further investigate this issue.
We now turn our attention more directly to the existence of a  possible 
inhibitory mechanism that operates on the cognitive processing of aversive 
emotional, or threat-related, information. Som e researchers have reported
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this effect a s  an avoidance of processing aversive information (Bonanno, 
Davies, Singer, & Schwartz, 1991; Fox 1994). It is unclear if the processing 
of information is avoided, or whether the information is inhibited following the 
pre-attentive processing. In fact, it seem s necessary  for som e processing of 
information to have occurred to initiate either an avoiding or inhibiting 
process. It is also unclear if information is inhibited by dampening activation 
or that the additional processing is simply interfered with and hindered.
A possible inhibitory mechanism is further supported by evidence that 
responding is slowed to stimuli that has previously been ignored (Neumann 
& DeSchepper, 1992; Tipper. 1985; Tipper & Cranston, 1985; Tipper &
Driver, 1988; Yee, 1991). This effect has been termed "negative priming" and 
is said to result from inhibition of processing the ignored stimuli. In most of 
these  research efforts, subjects are required to respond to a  stimulus while 
ignoring one or more stimuli. In separate trials, the target stimuli may be 
identical, or similar, to the previous distractor stimuli. The comparison of 
response times to targets which have previously been distractors and targets 
which have not been distractors serves a s  an index of negative priming, or 
ignored priming, effects. Tipper and his colleagues have docum ented that 
negative priming occurs when the target w as the previous distractor as  well 
a s  when the target w as semantically related to the previous distractor (Tipper, 
1985). The slowing of responses to a  target related to a  previous distractors 
suggests that any inhibition, or interference, with cognitive processing 
operates through a network of information such a s  those proposed by 
network theories (Anderson & Bower, 1973; Bower, 1981; Collins & Loftus, 
1975). The effect of negative priming occurring when the target and 
distractor were semantically related also occurred when the stimuli were
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presented in different forms (e.g. drawings and words; Tipper & Driver, 1988). 
This result w as interpreted a s  indicating that inhibition had not merely 
effected the episodic memory but rather the "meaning" of the stimulus.
This effect has also been found for both threat-related and neutral 
information. A recent investigation has extended th ese  findings by 
examining the amount of negative priming for threat-related targets in 
comparison to nonemotional targets (Fox, 1994). The amount of negative 
priming w as also com pared among anxiety level groups. Low anxious 
individuals were found to exhibit greater negative priming than high anxiety 
individuals. This result supports the notion that low anxious individuals are 
more efficient at inhibiting, or interfering with, the processing of threat-related 
information. It was further suggested that anxiety disordered individuals have 
defective inhibition of threat-related information. It is important, however, to 
note that high anxious individuals are not identical to clinically anxious 
individuals, although both groups may exhibit high anxiety scores. Among 
other differences, the two groups may differ in the amount or intensity of an 
attentional bias toward threat information. In comparison to anxiety 
disordered individuals, high anxiety subjects may also exhibit defective 
inhibition but to a  lesser degree or intensity. In addition, the demonstration of 
this deficit by high anxiety subjects may rely upon state anxiety level.
In the current study, high anxiety subjects exhibited a  lack of a  facilitory 
effect for related emotional words which is taken a s  evidence for an inhibitory 
mechanism. These subjects did not, however, dem onstrate a  lack of a  
facilitory effect for repeated emotional words. High anxiety subjects revealed 
a  pattern of responses indicative of some, but not complete, interference with 
processing emotional information. Fox (1994) has also suggested that the
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ability to inhibit threat-related information is related to the aw areness of the 
presented stimulus. She hypothesized that inhibition is reduced when the 
threat stimuli is presented outside aw areness. High anxious subjects may 
only show a complete lack of inhibition when threat targets are presented 
without aw areness. This topic requires future research efforts to discover the 
param eters of an interaction between inhibition and anxiety level.
We would also like to note an issue of debate concerning the statistical 
analyses of the current study. It can be argued that the dependent variables 
(lexical decision times for each condition) are not true repeated m easures. It 
can also be argued that th ese  dependent variables are intercorrelated and 
should best be analyzed using a  MANOVA framework. MANOVA analysis 
would allow examination of differences in patterns of responses between 
groups. In the current investigation, however, only responses to two of the 
eight dependent variables are predicted to vary between groups. A 
significant MANOVA would only result if the responses to these  two variables 
are powerful enough to override the similarities among the other six 
variables. B ecause of this lack of power to detect true differences in a  
MANOVA framework, it can be argued that a  mixed model analysis is most 
appropriate. This methodology of analysis, however, varies from the 
analyses performed in previous studies and literature. Although the current 
analyses consisting of repeated m easures ANOVAs may be losing favor 
among statisticians, it allows for direct comparison of the current study's 
results with the results from the study being replicated and extended 
(Jackson & Geer, 1993b). The decision of the most appropriate analyses for 
future studies of this nature remains debated.
75
The current investigation has resulted in the replication of both semantic 
and repetition priming. Although emotional priming, a s  docum ented by Hill 
and Kemp-Wheeler (1989b), w as not replicated the differential sem antic 
priming effects for emotional and nonemotional words, a s  docum ented by 
Jackson and G eer (1993b) w as replicated for high anxious individuals. 
Differential repetition priming effects for emotional and nonemotional words 
w as found for low anxious individuals. The repetition priming effect for 
emotional primes w as significantly lass than the repetition priming for 
nonemotional targets. These results are not readily accom m odated by 
current theories of emotion and cognition. These results do support the 
notion of an inhibitory, or interfering, mechanism that interferes with the 
processing of emotional information. In conditions containing emotional 
prime and target words less repetition and related priming facilitation 
occurred than was expected. Emotional valence in the lexical decision task 
w as associated with slower responding than observed for nonemotional 
information. It is suggested that this slowing resulted from an inhibition, or 
interference with the processing of emotional information. It is also proposed 
that this mechanism operates within a semantic network. This proposal is 
supported by results from the current study indicating less related priming for 
emotional words than nonemotional words. T hese results, however, were 
only present for subjects with high sta te  and/or trait anxiety, suggesting that 
the phenom enon is precarious.
This hypothesized inhibitory, or interfering, m echanism has  implications 
for cognitive processing of emotional, or threat-related information. Although 
attention to threat is vital to survival, over-responding to threatening 
information or the tendency to interpret ambiguous stimuli a s  threatening may
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be counter-productive to successful functioning. The ability to inhibit 
responding to threat-related information also seem s to be a  vital part of an 
overall, functioning system. Current models of semantic networks do not 
adequately explain the results of the current study along with recent studies 
(Fox, 1994; Jackson & Geer, 1993b). These studies provide strong support 
for the existence of a  phenomenon that results in interference of processing 
emotional information. The param eters of this phenomenon, however, are 
som ew hat elusive.
It appears that less facilitation for related priming of emotional, in 
comparison to nonemotional, information suggests that this interference 
occurs within a  semantic network system. In contrast, less facilitation for 
related priming of emotional, compared to nonemotional, information 
suggests that this interference may occur at either a  perceptual level or within 
a  sem antic network system. Because low anxious subjects exhibited less 
facilitation for emotional information in repetition priming and high anxious 
subjects exhibited less facilitation for emotional information in related 
priming, the nature of this hypothesized phenomenon remains uncertain. 
Future replication and extension of the current research are necessary  to 
clarify the existence and nature of a  phenomenon that inhibits, or interferes, 
with the processing of emotional information.
In addition, the current investigation suggests that to accurately examine 
the interaction between anxiety and cognitive performance, partialling motor 
responses from the data must be considered. The relationship between 
anxiety and motor responding is of great importance to conclusions drawn 
from cognitive task experiments that require motor responding. Most 
investigations, however, assum e motor responding to be a  random variable.
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The current investigation's results indicate that motor responding is 
associated with trait anxiety level and is not a  random variable.
Future research efforts are required to further document the proposed 
inhibitory mechanism that has been described and dem onstrated in this 
study. It is accepted that identification of threat-related information is 
beneficial to survival. If low anxious individuals dem onstrate this ability, but 
are also able adequately a s se s s  the actual risk of danger, it is important to 
understand the mechanism by which this occurs. Understanding the 
functioning of low-anxious individuals serves to increase the understanding 
of the dysfunction of high anxious and clinically anxious individuals. In 
particular, this line of research may increase our knowledge concerning how 
treatm ents designed to reduce dysfunctional anxiety achieve their goals. In 
addition, this line of research add resses the integration of cognitive and 
emotional system s and implies that cognition and emotion not only function 
as  a  team  but are necessary to the other.
Potential avenues for continued research include comparing groups with 
differing levels of anxiety with anxiety-disordered individuals, comparing 
inhibitory effects upon social threat and physical threat targets for individuals 
with varying levels of anxiety, and examining inhibited responding to threat- 
related information presented with and without conscious aw areness. It is 
hoped that the current study will encourage further investigation of an 
inhibitory mechanism that operates on the processing of aversive emotional, 
or threat-related, information.
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d isea se  
burglar 

























































































Nonemotional Target Words Emotionality Familiarity
g a rag e  0.00 3.28
jacket 0.30 3.99






eag le  0.70 2.31
margin 0.00 2.83
bronze 0.30 2.11
m atches -0.25 3.66
costum e 0.14 2.84
markings -0.05 2.65
dirt 0.20 4.29






































E E N E-Related
Taraet Prime Prime Prime
murder suffer w aters brutal
cancer prison mirror tumors
war fat hat bad
terror lonely circle horror
grief curse chair mourn
fearful cheated cushion shaking
jealous use less curtain resents
dread blam e wrist fears
fatal cruel owner toxic
killer morbid plasm a sniper
p lague threat smooth blight
d isea se assault lettuce afflict
burglar shatter trailer robbers
desp ised helpless bookcase detested
hurt bomb tray ache
sting fault train bites
poison m ugger rhythm deadly
death sham e close drown
torture choking prairie torment
beaten stupid cradle abused
accident defeated baseball crashing
cripple worried package m angle
illness dislike balcony ailment
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Emotional Word Pair Rating of Relationship
Taraet Prime
murder brutal 5.81









cripple m angle 5.21

































































STATE-TRAIT ANXIETY INVENTORY 
EXAMPLES
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State Anxiety Questionnaire 
1 = not at all 2= somewhat 3= moderately so  4= very much so
A. I feel at ease  ........................................................................... (1) (2) (3) (4)
B. I feel upset   (1) (2) (3) (4)
Trait Anxiety Questionnaire 
1 = almost never 2= sometim es 3= often 4= almost always
A. I am a  steady person
B. I lack self-confidence
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
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